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The political world has experienced a “populist moment” (Brubaker 2017). Due to the 
success of populist parties around the world in the last two decades, populism research 
has become one of the hottest bandwagons in political research. While there is today a 
huge database of case studies of populist parties, politicians and voters, there remains a 
controversy in the research field: an uncertainty over what populism is. The concept of 
populism is felt to be too diverse (Woods 2014; 2017), abused (Mudde & Kaltwasser 
2012, 1) and inadequate (Jansen 2011, 76) for empirical purposes. 
Whereas many scholars of populism (if not most) would argue that the problem is the 
concept’s ambiguity and inaccuracy, thus arguing for a more precise conceptualisation of 
populism (e.g. Jansen 2011; Moffitt and Tormey 2014), this thesis argues quite the oppo-
site. First, there is nothing wrong with the concept. It is not the concept that is too ambig-
uous — it is the reality that it attempts to represent that is too messy to be particularised 
in a singular concept. Second, due to the messiness of this reality, any attempt at articu-
lating a precise conceptualisation is doomed to fail. Third, and most importantly, since 
no possible conceptualisation is going to be defined well enough to represent the reality 
of populism faithfully, political science would do better by making an inquiry into the 
very notion of representation inherent to the concept. What is needed is an ‘ontological 
turn’ in political science towards a performative, nonmodern and multiple ontology. 
This thesis is an attempt to open the door for such an ontological turn by doing a case 
study of the multiple practices by which “populism” is performed in Cas Mudde’s article 
“The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy” (2010). Cas Mudde is an associ-
ate professor of political science at University of Georgia, and one of the most acknowl-
edged experts in populism, with over 20,000 citations on Google Scholar, and almost 
4,000 citations in the year 2019 alone (as of May 2020). His book Populist Radical Right 
Parties in Europe (2007) is a cornerstone to studying the populist radical right (having 
been cited by over 4000 academic texts), and his definition of populism as a “thin centred 
ideology” has become popular among empirically oriented populism researchers due to 





However, this thesis argues that the notion of representation inherent to such an approach 
to studying populism is flawed. Representations do not simply emerge as social constructs 
of a non-social reality — they are performed, or better, enacted as representations of the 
“real world”. This productive performativity is practiced by a multiplicity of human and 
nonhuman actors (Barad 2003; Law 2004; Mol 2002). Thus, this thesis is an attempt to 
answer the following research question: 
What kind of entities and practices enact “populism” in Cas Mudde’s (2010) article? 
By describing the multiplicity of practices enacting a study of populism, I hope to make 
a case for an alternative ontology which acknowledges populism as a multiple concept, 
rather than a concept in the singular that is asked to represent a reality that is simply too 
messy for such a particularisation. That is, as a concept which is granted the status of a 
Thing (Latour 2005b; 2013) rather than being “black-boxed” as a representation of an 
object (Latour 2004; Law 2004). 
The structure of this thesis is the following. In chapter two I present a literature review 
over the various conceptualisations of “populism” in contemporary political sciences. 
Here I focus especially on an approach to measuring populist attitudes: the ideational 
approach, to which Cas Mudde’s (2010) understanding of populism is central. In chapter 
three I present the ontological framework of this study, by first discussing the prerequi-
sites and the epistemological problems of the modern, “representationalist”, social sci-
ences, and then moving towards presenting an alternative ontology: a nonmodern multi-
ple ontology. Chapter four regards the methodology and the research material of this 
study. The analysis of the populist attitudes enacted in Mudde’s (2010) study is reported 
in chapter five. This chapter is divided into three parts: first, an analysis of Mudde’s 
(2010) article; second, an analysis of his sources (the Eurobarometer surveys); and third, 
an examination of how the various entities and practices have travelled between these 
two. Finally, in chapter six, I present my findings and discuss the outcomes of this thesis. 
Since this is an exercise in political sociology (or a study of political science) and a study 
located in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), it is relevant to the body of 
academic literature in several disciplines: this is an interdisciplinary study in sociology 





2 Populism in the political sciences 
“Populism” has become an increasingly trending word both in the media and in the aca-
demia in only a few years, following the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald 
Trump. In 2015, the words “populism” or “populist” appeared in The New York Times 
671 times — one year later that number had more than doubled to 1,399. According to 
the Web of Science database, only 76 articles were published in 2010 with one of the two 
words in the title — only seven years later, in 2017, the number of annual publications 
had risen to 322. Populism has become such a buzzword that it was even declared word 
of the year by the Cambridge Dictionary in 2017. (Rooduijn 2019, 362.) 
As a sociologist especially interested in political concepts, I have found great interest in 
this buzzword. By speaking to friends and acquaintances from different academic back-
grounds (or without an academic background), I have come to the conclusion that popu-
lism is one of those political concepts about which almost everyone, from laypeople to 
experts, seem to have an opinion and some sort of (claimed) knowledge. Yet, when asked 
what populism is, I get multiple different answers, or the question might be met with a 
“who knows?” 
Of course, laypeople should not be expected to be able to answer such a question. But 
how about all the political researchers studying populism? Hence, in 2017 I started 
working on my Bachelor’s thesis on the populist radical right. To my surprise, these po-
litical experts did not seem to know exactly either. Many scholars were frustrated with 
the seemingly impossible task of operationalising the disparate “features” or “compo-
nents”, of which populism is theoretically composed (Brubaker 2017; Van Hauwaert, 
Schimpf and Azevedo 2018). Each methodological failure seemed to force a return to 
even more theoretical and conceptual work. The few cautiously accepted conceptualisa-
tions seemed to be circulated across relatively small cliques of like-minded scholars ra-
ther than gaining validity in the research community as a whole. What I, among so 
many other political scholars, found is that the concept of populism is undoubtedly a 
deeply contested concept (e.g. Brubaker 2017; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; Rooduijn 





In this chapter I discuss, first, how populism is generally conceptualised across the main 
traditions in populism studies. These conceptualisations do share some resemblances, 
mainly a somewhat cautious agreement over its “core elements” (Woods 2014), but the 
most troubling question for this field of study seems to be what the genus of populism is 
(Hawkins 2019; Rooduijn 2019). In the second sub-section, I discuss an approach to 
measuring populist attitudes; the premises of the ideational approach. This tradition has 
become popular due to the operationality of its conceptualisation and its methodological 
cogency. However, critics have found it to be inherently positivist and lacking in relia-
bility (Hawkins 2019; Van Hauwaert et al. 2018). 
2.1 A contested concept 
There is a plurality of populisms: from ideologically positioned right-wing to left-wing 
versions of populism, geographically varying populisms in all parts of the world (Euro-
pean and American populisms being the most typically compared), and different types, 
or genera, of populisms. Each context seems to give birth to a new analytical unit of 
populism, slightly different, but similar enough to be counted as a member in the family 
of populisms. This thesis is not concerned with the plurality of right- or left-wing popu-
lisms nor with the differences between the European and American versions, since these 
are usually explained with reference to ideological or geographical context and do not 
cause controversies among political students. However, what I wish to discuss in this 
chapter are the controversies concerning the genus — the “ontic nature”— of populism. 
In other words, the populism in all these different populisms. 
Dwayne Woods (2014) summarises three broad traditions in populism studies, each with 
its own ontic object and definition of populism. The first is populism as ideology. In this 
tradition, populism is often understood as a thin ideology, in the sense that it is not nec-
essarily an ideology by itself, but connected to ideological thinking, such as nativism, 
anti-elitism and authoritarianism (Mudde 2004; 2007; 2010; Mudde and Kaltwasser 
2012). In the search for a minimum definition of populism, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal 
Rovira Kaltwasser (2012, 9) define populism as a “thin-centred ideology” with a “re-





socialism) or thin (e.g. ecologism, nationalism),” in order to provide the concept a flexi-
bility that reflects “the chameleonic nature of populism”.  The ideologies attached to pop-
ulism are perceived to be relative and depend on national socio-political contexts. Popu-
lism is not thought to be a fully-fledged ideology — such as conservatism, liberalism or 
socialism — since it lacks its own “programmatic scope” (Hawkins 2019, 60) and a suf-
ficient level of “intellectual refinement and consistency” (Mudde 2004, 544). Rather, its 
ideological content is always relative to other ideologies (hence, the emergence of left- 
and right-wing populisms).  
In this tradition, populism is often considered to be an “ideational construct” with certain 
contents (Van Hauwaert, et al. 2018). What that content is varies from scholar to scholar, 
context to context and study to study, but the core “ideological feature” is often agreed to 
be composed of attitudes such as “anti-elitism” and “nativism”. How these two are con-
ceptualised further depends partly on the philosophical tradition of the particular scholar 
and the specific vocabulary used to define the concept. 
The second tradition, as summarised by Woods (2014), is populism as a political strategy. 
In this tradition, the focus is not on the content of populism, but on the form: how the 
populists per-form populism. Here the focus is often on the political party leader and the 
performative elements1 of populism (Hawkins 2019). Populism is considered to be a sort 
of a rhetoric or a communication style used to gain popularity and power, rather than 
drive forward ideological convictions. Instead of focusing on what populists say, the fo-
cus is on how they say it: as long as a politician refers to a power struggle between “the 
people” and “the elite”, (s)he can be considered to be a populist, either “thin” or “thick” 
(Jagers and Walgrave 2007). Populism, in this tradition, is a means for something else.  
The third tradition is to consider populism as a discourse (Woods 2014). This tradition 
builds on the work of Ernesto Laclau, considered by many to be the “most influential 
theorist of populism” (Brubaker 2017), who defines populism as a “social logic” and a 
 
1 As will become clear later, the notion of performativity in this tradition of populism studies is not in line 





“mode of articulation”, rather than an entity with content or a style (Laclau 2005). Popu-
lism constructs its own discourse, a dichotomic construction of the social, in which soci-
ety is ultimately divided into two frontiers, the people and the power (de la Torre 2019; 
Laclau 2005). Rather than being a response to a priori inequalities and struggles between 
the two camps, populism constructs a political reality in which these two antagonistic 
groups are pitted against each other. In order for this to be possible, two conditions need 
to be met and to co-exist: first, there needs to be a plurality of unsatisfied demands from 
a group of people without the power to satisfy them; second, an inability of an institutional 
system to “absorb” these as different demands (Laclau 2005). This situation, according 
to Laclau (2005), leads to an “equivalential moment” in which the plurality of demands 
is singularised by a thus far “empty signifier”: populism. 
Each of these three traditions both vary and overlap in methodology and research focus, 
thus presenting slightly different versions of populism. When studying populism as an 
ideology or a political strategy, the method chosen is often some sort of quantitative con-
tent analysis that measures some kind of content, either belonging to ideological features 
or speech acts (e.g. Jagers and Walgrave 2007, Mudde 2010). If ideology is to be studied, 
scholars often focus on political party manifestos, whereas if populism is studied as a 
political strategy or a discourse, they tend to focus on performances. 
Despite these differences in conceptualisations and methodologies, each tradition refers 
to similar core concepts associated with populism (Woods 2014). The two obvious ones 
are the two antagonistic groups, “the people” and “the elite” (sometimes referred to as the 
establishment or the power bloc). Populism is ultimately perceived to be about a power 
struggle between the oppressed and unsatisfied people and an institutionalised elite who 
holds the political power. “The people” is defined as lacking the power it should hold as 
the demos of the democracy, and “the elite” is defined as having a privileged access to 
political power, which it should not have in a democracy. The elite and the (liberal) dem-
ocratic system that has allowed such an elite to grow have thus failed the democratic 





Hence, another concept that is associated with populism is democracy (which is itself 
another contested enough concept to get political theorists fired up). Even though every-
one seems to agree that there is a special relation between democracy and populism, the 
nature of this relation remain widely disputed. Margaret Canovan (2002; 2004), for ex-
ample, has labelled populism as “the ideology of democracy”, yet problematised its dem-
ocratic ideals as in many ways anti-democratic. Ernesto Laclau (2005), on the other hand, 
has argued that in a democracy, populism is the same as politics. Populism is democratic 
politics at its core, since populism… 
means putting into question the institutional order by constructing an underdog as 
an historical agent - i.e. an agent which is an other in relation to the way things 
stand. But this is the same as politics. We only have politics through the gesture 
which embraces the existing state of affairs as a system and presents an alternative 
to it (or, conversely, when we defend that system against existing potential alter-
natives). (Laclau 2005, 47–48.) 
On the other side of this dispute are Cas Mudde (2004; 2007) and Jan-Werner Müller 
(2015) who contrast populism with (liberal) democracy, arguing that the ideal democracy 
of populists is in fact ethnocratic and authoritarian, since it requires the homogenisations 
of a “pure people” and its others. Populists rarely refer to a people, as one group among 
others, but to the people, as a holistic and homogenized majority of a like-minded whole, 
represented by the populists as the rightful claimers of the democratic power (Müller 
2015). Carlos de la Torre (2019), on the other hand, contrasts populism with the demo-
cratic power itself, by suggesting that populists only strive to reclaim it — they are thus 
seen as challengers for a political power they do not have. But what happens when a 
populist succeeds in gaining power? Do populists cease being populists once they stop 
challenging the power? A solution for this dilemma, according to de la Torre (2019), is 
to separate analytically populists seeking power and populists in power. 
Due to the different perspectives on populism’s relation to democracy, the tendency is 
that those who understand populism as an ideology also tend to argue that populists are 
against liberal democratic principles and more often than not associated with right-wing 





who understand populism as a political strategy or a discourse, do not conceptualise pop-
ulism on the basis of a priori ideologies, thus leaving open the possibility of almost any-
one being populist: a populist is someone who uses populist rhetoric in order to bring 
forward certain values or ideas. Those who study populism as a left-wing phenomenon 
value populism more often in positive and emancipatory terms: one of such scholars was 
Ernesto Laclau himself. 
To conclude, there is an ambiguity regarding what populism is. Some argue that the con-
cept is too diverse and thus often reduced to an “empty analytic shell” (Woods 2014). 
Laclau (2005), for example, referred to the concept of populism as an “empty signifier”. 
Moffitt and Tormey (2014, 390), on the other hand, criticise such open-ended conceptu-
alisations for losing the “analytical utility of the concept”. Others defend such minimalist 
definitions for their generalisability and their potential to bring much needed consensus 
to this field of research (e.g. de la Torre and Mazzoleni 2019; Pappas 2016).  
However, there are issues about which there is some consensus already. It is generally 
agreed that populists claim to represent “the people” — the demos of democracy — and 
defends their right to reclaim the political power from its current holders — “the elite” 
— who have unlawfully claimed the power over the people. Populism is, in other words, 
something that presents a democratic politics as a struggle between the oppressed people 
and the established elites of the society. But what remains widely disputed, is what this 
something is: an ideology, a political strategy, a communication style, a discourse, a type 
of politics? The big question for this ever-increasing field of research to answer seems to 
be still: what is populism? 
2.2 Measuring populist attitudes 
One recently grown approach to studying populism as measurable attitudes is the idea-
tional approach. This perspective approaches populism as a set of ideas, a combination 
of different attitudes. This approach has gained popularity recently for a number of rea-





of populism. That is, what populists gain from certain public opinions. Contrary, the ide-
ational approach focuses on the demand-side of the phenomenon, and particularly on “the 
populist potential” among individual voters (Van Hauwaert et al. 2018). It attempts to 
explain the demand for a populist politics that would represent the a priori populist ideas 
across populations. Scholars in this tradition thus set out to find and measure these pop-
ulist attitudes in given geographical contexts, in order either to explain the success of 
local or national populist actors, or to predict the electoral success of populist parties 
(Hawkins 2019). 
It is no coincidence that the ideational approach has grown in popularity at the same time 
as many Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) have found remarkable success across 
Europe. Before this recent uprising of PRRPs, populism was widely linked to democratic, 
emancipatory and left-wing values, such as the belief in popular sovereignty, which de-
fended the oppressed against the oppressors (e.g. Laclau 2005). On the other hand, polit-
ical scientists of the early 21st century studying the radical right struggled to explain the 
sudden appeal and success of radical right parties connected with fascist groups from the 
past and the present. Surprisingly, empiricists studying the radical right found populist 
arguments and values among the radical right parties and their supporters. Populism had 
suddenly become a phenomenon connected with the radical right and seemed to explain 
their sudden appeal: these were not only newly emerging radical right parties, but populist 
radical right parties (Hawkins 2019; Mudde 2007). The success of a PRRP was to be 
explained with the concept of populism, not its radical right values.  
Thus, scholars promoting the ideational approach tend to be critical of theories of popu-
lism that assert that populism is in some way radical or a consequence of social patholo-
gies — a social movement born in a dysfunctional society. On the contrary, populism is 
perceived to derive from mainstream politics — from the premises of democracy itself 
(Canovan 2002; 2004) and the normal political values of voters (Mudde 2010). Cas 
Mudde (2007), for example, explains the wording of the “Populist Radical Right” (PRR) 
with the argument that it is not populism that makes the movement radical, it is the au-
thoritative ideologies of the socio-cultural right. Populism is a gateway for these radicals 





Cas Mudde, whose study of European populist values will be analysed later, is one of the 
main theorists of this tradition. Mudde’s (2007) renowned definition of PRRPs has gained 
remarkable popularity among scholars of PRR. Mudde (2007) deconstructs the term 
“populist radical right” by distinguishing its three “core features”: nativism, authoritari-
anism and populism. He defines the socio-cultural right as an ideology that emphasises 
the deterministic inequalities across populations, arguing that some groups are worth 
more than others, which is manifested in thin ideologies such as nativism or ethnonation-
alism. What makes these right-wingers radical is their refusal to accept the pluralism of 
liberal democratic systems: PRRPs tend to be against consensual politics and cooperation 
with political opponents, believing that their views are the only ones acceptable. Mudde 
(2007) labels these radical views authoritarian. Populism is the polarizing view of the 
society as “separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ 
versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the 
volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004, 562; 2007, 23; 2010). Pop-
ulism as an analytical “attitudinal” unit is operationalised as “anti-elite” and “anti-estab-
lishment” attitudes (Mudde 2010, 1177). 
The ideational approach studies the content of populism: attitudes that may be described 
as “anti-elite” or “anti-establishment”. Hence it presupposes that such attitudes exist 
ahead of a populist discourse (contrary to what discourse theorists might argue). These 
attitudes are often collected and measured with public opinion surveys in order to explain 
or to predict the success of contemporary populists (Hawkins 2019; Van Hauwaert et al. 
2018). However, such an approach requires a realist and a positivist view of values and 
attitudes: as entities existing independently among the relevant populations. What such 
measures need to do is to represent as faithfully as possible the attitudes, out there, in the 
real world.  
This, however, might not be as straight-forward as it sounds. Carlos de la Torre and Oscar 
Mazzoleni (2019) discuss two critiques of Mudde’s conceptualisation. First, methodolog-
ically, it requires a certain apriorism by the reserarcher, something Mudde (2007, 13) 
himself seems to be aware of: “one is faced with the problem of circularity: we have to 





while we need a priori criteria to select the parties that we want to define”. In other words, 
in order to define something as populist and consequently populism as something, one 
first needs to have an a priori conception of what populism is and how to detect it. This 
is unfortunately an epistemological problem Mudde and his ideational approach col-
leagues are yet to solve. Another problem is one of instability: Mudde’s definition of 
populism is quite static and relies on a notion of populism as a stable property of political 
actors. This, however, does not reflect well the fluidity of politics as a process of change 
(de la Torre and Mazzoleni 2019).  
To summarise, the ideational approach is a quite recently developed approach to measur-
ing populist attitudes, or a populist potential, among populations. It builds theoretically 
and methodologically on Cas Mudde’s (2004; 2007) conceptualisation, according to 
which populism is a thin-centred ideology. Populism is, in other words, ideational or 
attitudinal. The goal is to measure the underlying attitudes that manifest the demand for 
populist politics: that is, the ideas that contribute to the success of populist parties. In the 
next chapter, I will discuss the ontological consequences of taking an alternative approach 






3 A nonmodern ontology 
The approach to studying populism as attitudes and ideational constructs is possible if 
one accepts as the starting point a representationalist ontology, in which the sciences are 
understood to represent a reality independent of scientific practices. In order to measure 
something, that something needs to exist independently from the measurement. In other 
words, there needs to be a positivist notion of an empirical reality “out there” to be rep-
resented by a certain conceptual and theoretical knowledge “in here”. 
This thesis moves towards a very different ontology and argues for an “ontological turn” 
(Jensen 2017) in populist studies, an ontology in which the idea of performativity is for 
once taken seriously (Barad 2003). This social ontology starts from adopting and accept-
ing the idea that no entities exist by themselves in a real world “out there”, but everything 
is performed, or better put, enacted (Law 2004; Mol 2002). This ontological turn has three 
major consequences for the way populism, along with other entities, is understood in this 
thesis. The first consequence is how the entity2 of populism can be grasped and studied. 
The second consequence regards the definition of agency and, thus, how an actor is de-
fined. Third, it also has grave consequences for how “reality” is conceived. These three 
consequences will be discussed in detail in this chapter. 
The ontological approach of this thesis owes a great deal to the social ontology of Bruno 
Latour, named a “nonmodern constitution” in his ground-breaking work We Have Never 
Been Modern (1993). This book can be taken as the starting point for the philosophical 
Latour — or the “middle Latour”, as classified by Graham Harman (2014) — who had 
before this point been mostly occupied with empirical laboratory studies. The central the-
sis of Latour (1993) is that modernity — or as Latour calls it, the “modern constitution” 
— as the binary distinction between a priori real natures and constructed societies, has 
never been fully adopted by the modern sciences and its distinctions are unfounded. Since 
then, he has developed his social ontology in numerous other works (e.g. Latour 1999a; 
 
2 An entity in this study is not the same as an object, as in an essence-by-itself. No entity is an entity by 
itself, but always performed as a certain entity by another entity. This will be clarified further in chapter 





2004; 2013), along with developing the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) in the late 80s and 
the 90s.  
Other ANT-scholars, especially John Law (2004; 2009) and Annemarie Mol (2002), have 
influenced my understanding of this social ontology and therefore the overall formulation 
of this thesis. However, even though many of the theorists referenced in thesis are affili-
ated with ANT and the ontological framework of this thesis is in many ways in line with 
ANT, I have chosen to avoid the term ANT in this thesis in order not to confuse my own 
theoretical and methodological premises with an a priori “toolbox” named “ANT”. This 
is because ANT was from the very beginning not supposed to be considered a rigid meth-
odology, or a theory of the social, but an ontology (Latour 1999b). In fact, most ANT 
theorists referenced here have rejected the methodological premises of ANT one way or 
another, and thus its functionality as a theory (Law 1999). Hence, I refer to each theorist 
individually and not as a representative of a certain theoretical tradition. That said, Latour, 
Law and Mol share very similar ontological premises due to their related backgrounds in 
philosophy and sociology. I also want to clarify that, since Latour has become such a big 
name in both philosophy and sociology, my focus in this thesis is on Latour’s “sociolog-
ical work”, that is, on his social ontology rather than his philosophical œuvre as a whole. 
In other words, because of my education in sociology, I read Latour, Law and Mol as a 
student situated in sociology. 
In this chapter I will summarise briefly the central premises of the nonmodern ontology 
to identify the central differences between the approaches of the modern (that is, repre-
sentationalist) political sciences, such as the ideational approach, and the nonmodern per-
formative approach. In order to understanding what happens in Mudde’s (2010) study 
and other related survey-based political studies, it is imperative that the differences be-
tween the representationalist and performative ontologies central to this thesis are pre-
sented clearly enough ahead of the analysis itself. 
Hence, there are a few key concepts to sort out. I will first, in the next sub-section (3.1), 
discuss the modern and representationalist distinctions of the empirical/conceptual and 
nature/society, summarised here as the “in here” and the “out there”. In the second sub-





scrutinised as I present the central differences between the “representationalist” approach 
and an alternative ontological approach called “performative” (Barad 2003) and “non-
modern” (Latour 1993). I also discuss what consequences a nonmodern social ontology 
has for conceiving the nature of agency and the definition of an entity. In the third sub-
section (3.3), I discuss what sort of metaphors we may use to describe the “realities” of 
this alternative ontology. When there is no longer a reality to represent, we discover that 
the nonmodern reality of Things is in fact multiple — a mess (Latour 2005b; Law 2004; 
Mol 2002)3. 
3.1 The “in here” and the “out there” 
Conceptual: related to or based on ideas 
Empirical: based on experiments or experience rather than ideas or theories 
(Oxford Learner’s Dictionary 2020) 
A common way of understanding the nature of knowledge in empirical sciences is by 
dividing knowledge into two distinct domains: the conceptual and the empirical (Gad and 
Ribes 2014; Jensen 2014). As the definition from Oxford Learner’s Dictionary above 
suggests, the two are opposites — or rather the two sides of a coin. Whereas “conceptual” 
refers to ideas, “empirical” refers to experience rather than ideas or theories. These two 
domains constitute the idea of the “in here” and the “out there”, which is considered to 
be the foundation of the representationalist sciences (Barad, 2003; Law 2004). Such a 
positivist notion of representation builds on an epistemological position in which scien-
tific knowledge is understood to be a representation of “nature” or the “real”. 
 
3 It should be clarified that the name “nonmodern multiple ontology”, that I occasionally use in this thesis, 
is not a homogeneous ontological movement officially named as such. Rather, it is an assemblage of similar 
ontological considerations of various theorists, who name their ontological approaches differently (ANT 
being one attempt to bring these together). The name is, in fact, an amalgamation of Bruno Latour’s (1993, 
139; 1999a; 2004) “nonmodern constitution” and Annemarie Mol’s (2002, 6) “multiple” conception of 
reality. These theorists do not represent a unified school of thought, but due to their similarities, and their 





One of the most telling analogies of such positivist representationalism is provided by 
Latour in Politics of Nature (2004, 10–18). Recounting an allegory by Plato in the Re-
public, Latour imagines a cave in which humans as knowers live. This cave represents 
the social, the society or, quite fittingly to the analogy, the in here. Then there is the 
outside of the cave: the out there, the real world, the empirical domain or nature. There 
is no way of knowing the out-thereness without escaping the cave. The humans therefore 
elect philosophers (or scientists) to escape the cave and to learn about the world out there. 
The philosophers then return to the cave to bring order and truth to the society of ignorant 
humans. These elected citizens have a special talent: they can move between the cave and 
the world out there without any transformation. 
This setting creates a distinction between “two houses” (Latour 2004, 13–14): the first 
being the cave of human subjects only able to produce social and cultural constructs, and 
unaware of the real surroundings outside the cave; the second being the world outside the 
cave, made of mute objects that constitute what is real but which may never educate the 
humans about the truths of the world because they lack the gift of speech. Then there are 
the elected citizens who have been granted the gift of representing the mute objects, thus 
finally giving them a voice. Nature finally speaks and reveals itself to the few elected 
representatives, who return to the cave to educate the prisoners of subjectivity and culture. 
Nature has been represented without social or cultural bias. 
This distinction has been scrutinized for decades by epistemologists and sociologists, par-
ticularly by social constructionists associated with the programme of sociology of scien-
tific knowledge (Jensen 2017; Law 2008), who argue that there is always a social bias in 
knowledge. Social constructionists have for a good part of the 20th century argued that 
scientific knowledge is social or “socially constituted” (Pinch and Bijker 1984). The di-
lemma between the two domains is understood to be the following. The only way the 
empirical sciences can conceive of an empirical world out there is by conceptualising it 
theoretically in here, thus making the the empirical thoroughly dependent on the concep-
tual and its inherently social and theoretical constructs, rather than being true to the ob-
jective nature it claims to represent (Gad and Ribes 2014; Jensen 2014). David Bloor 





but, on the contrary, gives “meaning to experience by offering a story about what under-
lies, connects and accounts for it.” The empirical thus becomes a consequence of the 
conceptual and everything known becomes “constitutively social” (Shapin 1995, 289). 
Yet, this empirical world must exist, otherwise there would not be anything to study. Or 
worse, the even more terrifying conclusion is that sciences only study social artefacts! 
Once we accept that knowledge is social (Bloor 1991; Shapin 1995), the distinction be-
tween an empirical domain out there and a conceptual domain in here becomes impossible 
and the out there becomes a mere social artefact. Either there exists an out there that we 
can never be aware of, precisely because of its “out-thereness”, or we access the out there, 
hence rendering its existence impossible by turning it into a conceptual in here. The em-
pirical sciences, social constructionists argue, never studied an empirical reality outside 
the sciences, but constructed socially constituted representations dependent on certain 
theoretical and conceptual knowledges (Bloor 1991; Gad and Ribes 2014; Jensen 2014; 
2017). These representations of the real are always false since they are contaminated with 
social factors. Hence, sociology of scientific knowledge is always a “sociology of error” 
(Bloor 1991). The question for the social constructionist tradition is not whether scientific 
knowledge is false, but how much it deviates from the real world.  However, Latour (1993; 
1999c) — as opposed to Bloor4 — argues that the social constructionists have made the 
dilemma between the out there and the in here simultaneously necessary but effectively 
impossible to solve, by arguing that everything is socially constructed. 
3.2 Performativity and enactment 
Does this really mean that we cannot tell anything about the “real world?” If everything 
is socially constructed, then what is true? This dilemma is tackled by Latour in many of 
his works (e.g. 1993; 1999a; 2004). By countering the “social constructionists” and the 
“postmoderns”, Latour (1993) questions the distinction between society and nature alto-
gether, arguing that social constructionism and postmodernism fail to solve the dilemma, 
 
4 A debate between these two, regarding this issue, is found in Bloor’s critique, “Anti-Latour” (1999), and 





since they remain stuck in the social domain and the impossible requisite for representa-
tion. Claiming everything to be socially constructed is, after all, placing every set of 
knowledge and every known object into the domain of the social. Since being postmodern 
means taking a position after the modernist position, hence being dependent on the very 
distinctions criticised, postmoderns make knowledge effectively impossible — making 
the postmoderns the worst of the worst for Latour (1993, 59–62): 
Postmodern? Not yet; the worst is still to come. [– –] With the postmoderns, the 
abandonment of the modern project is consummated. I have not found words ugly 
enough to designate this intellectual movement — or rather, this intellectual im-
mobility through which humans and non-humans are left to drift. [– –] There is 
only one positive thing to be said about the postmoderns: after them, there is noth-
ing. 
In order to escape the impossibility of the modern distinction between nature and society, 
we need to escape the social domain as well. We need to become not post-modern, but 
non-modern (Latour 1993). 
Being nonmodern is to be true to the notion of performativity — an ontological standpoint 
characterised as the opposite to representationalism by Karen Barad (2003). This stand-
point does not depend on modernist preformulated distinctions between what belongs to 
nature and what to society; what is a passive object and what is an active subject; what is 
located in here and what is out there, since its premise is that everything is performed as 
something by something. Everything moves in the same domain. It is no longer an a priori 
distinction that determines in advance the position, the attributes and the essence of any 
object or subject: it is the performative practice itself which determines the outcome — 
that is the “product” — of its producing power. To put it simply: the notion of performa-
tivity is anti-essentialist; instead of defining objects according to predefined configura-
tions, objects are defined according to the practices that produce the object. And because 
these practices tend to be multiple, so is the object (Mol 2002). 
The term “performativity” has a long history in the social sciences, being especially cen-
tral to dramaturgical sociology and feminist theory (Barad 2003). However, science stud-
ies scholars (e.g. Barad 2003; Mol 2002; Latour 1999a; Law 2004) have argued that the 





when we have truly abandoned the terms of representativity. Annemarie Mol (2002) ar-
gues that “to perform” carries with it unwanted dramaturgical connotations: firstly, as-
sumptions that there is a “script” (a macro-structure) that guides the performer and, sec-
ondly, that behind every performance exists a backstage (the real reality), promoting once 
again the idea that performances are false representations of the real — and so we have 
returned to the modern distinctions we tried to escape. Here, we may consider as an ex-
ample of such a notion of performativity the second tradition of populism studies, as sum-
marised by Woods (2014), in which populism is understood as a performance — a script 
for performing a certain populist character. 
Annemarie Mol (2002) and John Law (2004) have thus proposed an alternative term 
which does not depend on a priori scripts and backstages: to enact. “To perform” and “to 
enact” bear similar meanings: both indicate that objects are produced in and by practices 
rather than having a fixed essence. However, “to enact” has one important advantage over 
“to perform”, which allows us to escape the modern distinctions: what is enacted always 
acts back. If we accept the full notion of performativity — that is, the one of enaction — 
then whatever acts has to be en-acted as an actor by another actor (Latour 1999a; Law 
2004; Mol 2002). What is conceived here is a reversal of the modernist definition of an 
actor, according to which an actor is something that acts. This would only indicate a return 
to an essentialist notion of an actor-by-itself. According to the nonmodern definition of 
an actor, nothing acts by itself, rather an actor is what is acted upon. As summed up by 
Latour (2005a, 46): “an actor is what is made to act by many others.” All actions are, first, 
re-actions to inter-actions with other actors; secondly, en-actions of those other actors; 
and thirdly, en-acting of other actors. There cannot be, by this definition, an action with-
out an interaction in a network of two or several actors. Each actor is, ontologically speak-
ing, determined by a network of practices by a multiplicity of different actors (Latour 
1999a; 2005a; Mol 2002). Each actor is a collective of actors (Latour 2004). 
This reversal of the definition of an actor has important ramifications. First, agency is no 
longer defined by the essence or the pre-fixed configuration of an actor; instead agency 
is defined according to the effect on another course of action. Agency is what makes a 





to forget about the actor and to focus on the agency itself: it is the agency that defines the 
actor, not the other way around (Law and Mol 2008). Second, since agency is no longer 
defined according to the actor, it allows us to detach agency from being exclusively a 
human attribute, and to turn to a “posthumanist” account of performativity (Barad 2003). 
This means that any entity that produces an effect is an actor. Consequently, no entity is 
an entity by itself, but always enacted by another entity: “nothing is, by itself, either re-
ducible or irreducible to anything else. Never by itself, but always through the mediation 
of another” (Latour 1993, 113). Since nothing acts by itself, neither do humans — rather, 
being human is being enacted by a myriad of nonhuman actors. Things act too, matter 
matters, as Karen Barad (2003, 801) puts it: “Language matters. Discourse matters. Cul-
ture matters. There is an important sense in which the only thing that does not seem to 
matter anymore is matter.”  
Writing this thesis, for example, is a very human practice (only humans write theses), but 
would I not be a very poor writer without the pile of books I have had read for this work, 
the computer I am writing on and the coffee I am drinking in order to stay awake late at 
night? These nonhuman entities, on the other hand, are enacted too: by the authors re-
ferred to in this thesis and the trees that once grew in a forest somewhere before being 
chopped down and turned into paper; the computer scientists and the factory machines 
making it possible for me to write on my laptop; the coffee bean farmers in Colombia and 
the huge trading networks required to ship the brew to my home country and finally to 
my local grocery store. Each of these actors are enacted as well by actors I might be 
completely unaware of. The point being, I would not be the thesis writing graduate stu-
dent I am without this enormous amount of practices constantly enacting me. The entity 
of human is in fact a hybrid of human and nonhuman actors (Latour 1993; 1999a) or a 
cyborg, in Donna Haraway’s (1991) vocabulary. 
Because the meaning of agency and an actor has changed dramatically from how these 
are perceived by the moderns, most science studies scholars have become cautious with 
the term “actor”. Law and Mol (2008), for example, prefer to talk about the actor-enacted 
to underline the fact that each actor is enacted. Latour (1999a; 2004; 2005a) talks about 





depending on what I wish to emphasize in the specific context. With “actor” I emphasize 
the entity that acts; with “enactor” I wish to emphasize the outcome of the enaction and 
the fact that the actor in consideration is, even though I might not mention it specifically, 
both enacted and enacting. All in all, both terms mean the same thing: an entity that has 
been enacted and is thus enacting other entities. 
Which consequences does this alternative definition of agency have on the domains of 
the out there and the in here? For a start, we no longer need a distinct domain of the out 
there, of which representationalists and social constructionists are completely dependent. 
Instead of constructing a dichotomy between knowing subjects and known objects, the 
object of knowledge — the out there — is now conceived to be a result of enacting prac-
tices, and vice versa. Instead of representing the out there, by leaving our cave in here, 
we perform it. The out there is what is enacted in here. In other words, representation is 
performed (Law 2008). Instead of an impossible dichotomy of two contrasting houses 
(Latour 2004), we finally have permission to stay in our reality and to try to explain what 
is at all times explainable, without having to be afraid of the “errors” (Bloor 1991) of 
representing a reality that is at all times out of our reach. Second, since the practices that 
enact the out there are multiple, so is the out there itself. If reality is enacted in multiple 
practices, then reality is multiple too (Law 2008; Mol 2002).  
3.3 Mess and the multiplicity of things 
If this is an awful mess… then would something less messy make a mess of de-
scribing it? (Law 2004, 1.) 
This rhetorical question, stated beneath an image of a mess, is asked by John Law in After 
Method (2004). He answers it himself: “the answer, I will argue, is that it tends to make 
a mess of it. This is because simple clear descriptions don’t work if what they are describ-
ing is not itself very coherent. The very attempt to be clear simply increases the mess” 
(Law 2004, 2). The world out there is a mess, he argues, and the empirical sciences at-
tempting to describe it as clearly as possible, in here, tend only to mess it up even further. 





because the details might change as we change our perspectives, or they might hide be-
hind another stroke of the brush. “Knowing” a mess is only possible by “techniques of 
deliberate imprecision”: by accepting that whatever is “known” changes and travels in 
ways that we cannot control, and by learning to describe them allegorically (Law 2004). 
This mess precedes the organising methods of the empirical sciences. Similarly to Michel 
Serres’ (2007) notion of noise, mess indicates a chaos of unorganised matter before a 
science creates taxonomies, classifications, hierarchisations or some generalisations 
about the ever-changing mess (Pyyhtinen and Tamminen 2011). Following Michel Fou-
cault’s (1972; 2002 [1970]) archaeological studies of classifying practices, Law (2004) 
argues that such classifications do not capture the entities under study — as one would 
capture a butterfly in a jar — but only a small portion which is then turned into a standard.  
Before an entity is successfully classified and turned into a statement about the nature of 
things, it remains a proposition: an uncertainty trying to convince the onlooker about its 
relevance (Foucault 1972; 2002 [1970]; Latour 2004). Propositions are not essentialising 
statements about objects, but occasions providing entities the chance to enact and be en-
acted (Latour 1999a, 141). They are “matters of concern” — unstable entities yet to have 
been given clear figurations — that are called upon to make possible statements about the 
nature of things. But once these entities are classified and turned into statements, they no 
longer move or change. They become black-boxed:  
Once the candidacy of the new entities has been recognized, accepted, legiti-
mized, admitted among the older propositions, these entities become states of 
nature, self-evidences, black boxes, habits, paradigms. No one discusses their 
rank and their importance any longer. They have been registered as full-fledged 
members of collective life. They are part of the nature of things, of common 
sense, of the common world. They are no longer discussed. They serve as indis-
putable premises to countless reasonings and arguments that are prolonged else-
where. (Latour 2004, 104.) 
Propositions are the building blocks of the collective (Latour 2004). Since each acting 
thing is an assemblage of many actors, Latour (2004) argues that things should be under-
stood as collectives — things that collect a multiplicity of actors. Since these collectives 





old system of statements should be abandoned. Statements do, after all, refer to stable 
matters of fact. Rather, the term “pro-position” provides a much better metaphor for de-
scribing the entities that enact and collect the collective. Propositions are, more than an-
ything, enactors (Latour 1999a). The more propositions a collective collects, the stronger 
the collective becomes at collecting. Once enough entities, as propositions, have been 
accepted as members of the collective, the old system of statements (that is, of represen-
tation) transforms them into stable facts about the singular nature of things. 
Bruno Latour (1999a) provides an illuminating example of this black-boxing of proposi-
tions by following a group of pedologists (soil scientists) studying a forest-savanna tran-
sition in the Amazon forest. This part of the forest is already marked: there are tags on 
the trees and on the ground informing the scientists what is what and where they are. He 
follows as one of the pedologists picks up a piece of the soil and puts it into a jar which 
is then tagged. The pedologist then compares the sample with other soil samples on a 
“pedocomparator” and finally transports the soil to his office, where he studies it with a 
microscope at his desk. This piece of soil is transformed by the pedologist from being a 
small piece of the soil belonging to the Amazon forest into being a sample put into a jar, 
then classified by comparing it to other samples and finally, becoming a large piece con-
taining small pieces under the microscope. The soil, as a collective of propositions, is 
gradually black-boxed; it has revealed everything it was supposed to, and it may be turned 
into a statement about the forest-savanna transition in a particular area of the Amazon 
forest. 
If we follow this piece of soil, not as an essence-by-itself, but as an enactor, we find that 
there is in fact a multiplicity of the same soil sample. The soil changes its figuration de-
pending on how it is enacted to act by the pedologist and his equipment. It is first a piece 
of soil giving nutrition to the surrounding trees and plants; then the forest is tagged and 
the soil becomes a location and an indicator on a map; the pedologist picks up the piece 
of soil to enact it as a sample — a representative for the rest of the soil in the tagged area; 
it is then compared to other samples, which enacts it as a specific soil with specific colour 





the soil is taken away from the forest to reveal microscopic configurations under the mi-
croscope. The piece of soil not only changes its location, size and scale multiple times 
during this anecdote, but it is enacted as different entities with different agencies. The soil 
in the ground is not the same actor as the soil under the microscope: one gives life to 
plants and animals, the other reveals something to the scientist about the forest-savanna 
transition — but only when put under a microscope. Given that the soil is now considered 
to be not an object made out of statements, but a collective enacted by propositions: how 
many propositions are there in this short story? The pedologist is one, for sure, but so is 
the forest, the tags, the maps, the jar, the pedocomparator and the microscope. All of these 
propositions collect and associate different entities with the soil, making it a stronger and 
better articulated collective, and eventually a black-boxed object. 
Annemarie Mol (2002) has made a similar study, but about a disease — “atherosclerosis” 
— causing a symptom called “intermittent claudication” which causes pain in the legs of 
the patients. For four years she visited a hospital in the Netherlands once or twice a week 
to follow how the hospital personnel discover, diagnose, define and treat the disease in 
different hospital departments. As Latour (1999a) discovered with the soil samples and 
the pedologists in the Amazon forest, Mol (2002) found that the disease is diagnosed, 
described and treated differently by different actors in different locations. This is because 
the general practitioner in the consulting room, the surgeon in the operating theatre, the 
pathologist in the pathology laboratory and the radiologists in the radiology department 
all practice atherosclerosis differently, given their different educations, equipment and 
professional duties in the hospital organisation (not to mention the patients themselves 
and their families, occupations, daily walking routes, etc.). If an entity is indeed what is 
enacted through practices, then the disease seems to be multiple: “more than one — but 
less than many” (Law 2004, 59; Mol 2002, 55). 
It is “less than many” because even though it is multiple, this does not mean that it is 
plural. Being plural would mean that the disease was fragmented — but it is not, it some-
how hangs together. The hospital personnel speak about atherosclerosis in the singular. 





That's the lumen. There's blood cells inside it, you see. That only happens when 
a lumen is small. Otherwise it's washed out during the preparation. And here, 
around the lumen, this first layer of cells, that's the intima. It's thick. Oh, wow, 
isn't it thick! It goes all the way from here, to there. Look. Now there's your ath-
erosclerosis. That's it. A thickening of the intima. That's really what it is. (Mol 
2002, 30, my emphasis.) 
Even though the pathologist knows that the disease is diagnosed and treated very differ-
ently in other hospital departments — after all, the pathologist studies dead body parts 
and not live patients to be cured — he refers to it as the same disease as the one treated 
by the general practitioner or the surgeon. The fact that it is behaves differently in differ-
ent locations and different practices is explained by a matter of perspectives. The fact that 
the “angiography” produces different readings to the “duplex” is explained by its superior 
accuracy compared to the duplex — it represents the out there better. Yet, Mol (2002) 
argues, the disease as a set of enacting practices is a different entity from practice to 
practice, location to location. 
The point is not to claim that the atherosclerosis in patient x’s leg is a different disease 
than the atherosclerosis in patient z’s leg — that would return us to a question of plurality. 
There indeed exists a plurality of atheroscleroses: most adults older than 60 have some 
sort of atherosclerosis, even though most do not show any symptoms (WebMD.com). In 
contrast to the notion of plurality, multiplicity of an object refers to one, but multiple, 
object: an object that is one — as the disease “atherosclerosis” — but enacted by a mul-
tiplicity of practices. Mol’s (2002) conclusion is that it is only by coordinating all the 
multiple atheroscleroses into a single story, that it can finally be regarded as a single 
disease, an object. It is at the same time a single disease as it is ontologically multiple. 
Ontologically speaking, given the reality of the practices which enact the disease, it is 
more sensible to talk about multiple atheroscleroses rather than one. 
This coordination work is what Latour (1999a), Mol (2002) and Law (2004) have at-
tempted to describe in their respective studies: how a multiplicity of practices has been 
transformed into a singular object. These singularising practices of course variate from 
case to case, but Law (2004) has attempted to describe some practices — or effects of 





researcher needs an inscription device: some sort of research equipment capable of trans-
forming an object into a description of the object, for example a microscope or a survey 
questionnaire. These two, the object and the description of the said object, are two sepa-
rate entities. But then these two separated entities are translated as one. Once the report 
of the study is published, the description of the object is treated as a faithful reference to 
the object itself. In other words, the inscription devices — or the calculating devices 
(Latour 2013) — enact the out there in order to be able to represent it. They work as 
scripts for the representable out-thereness. 
The term calculation and even calculating devices should no longer lead us astray. 
That the equipment of economization allows calculations does not mean that it 
ceases to be performative for all that. If the data produced by value meters are 
calculable, it is for reasons that have to do with their nature as organizational 
scripts and not at all, as we shall see, because they refer back to some quantifiable 
matter toward which they would procure privileged access. (Latour 2013, 409.) 
Inscription devices are not intermediaries between an empirical out there and the 
knowledge in here, but mediators enacting the two domains as representing each other 
(Latour 1999; Latour 2005a). Concepts, as inscriptions of objects out there, work as the 
manifestations of the existence of the objects. In other words, concepts are enacted to 
perform that which they represent — the empirical out there (Gad and Ribes 2014).  
In order for this to happen, some or most of the practices enacting the concept need to be 
Othered (Law 2004). This means that the practices of the researcher and the inscription 
device differentiating the object from its representation do not travel from practice to 
practice, but are left undocumented or deleted from the final report. Maybe the researcher 
is careless, maybe some practices are felt to be too contradictory or futile to report, maybe 
the journal editor thinks the report is too long and needs to be cut. Be it as it may, this 
makes the remaining entities fluid and more suitable for manipulation: the fact that certain 
enacting practices have been Othered makes the present entities more translatable. This 
fluidity and the Othering of disparities grant the object a continuity out there (Law 2002; 
2004): despite its multiplicity, it still hangs together (Mol 2002). However, this does not 
mean that these Othered practices are absent — they are nonetheless manifested in the 





an object, or the “plasma” (Latour 2005a, 241–246; Law 2004; Pyyhtinen and Tamminen 
2011). By reading reports allegorically, one may account for these missing masses that 
must have been in order for the object to exist as it does (Law 2004). 
A final note to end this section. As there are many different terms for “actor” used in STS, 
so are there many for designating objects. Some scholars avoid the term “object” because 
of its connotations to passiveness and essentialism. In a posthumanist approach, the a 
priori distinction between object and subject fades: objectivity and subjectivity is per-
formed in and by the situated practices themselves (Haraway 1988). Objects are, after all, 
active and acting subjects too. Latour, for example, has written about “quasi-objects” and 
“quasi-subjects” (Latour 1993; 2013) and “subject-objects” (Latour 1999a). However, 
more recently, in connection to his political ontology, Latour (2005b; 2007; 2013) speaks 
of Things rather than objects: instead of talking about objects as “matters of fact”, he asks 
us to talk about Things as “matters of concern” (Latour 2007, 815). 
Borrowing from the etymology of the word, Latour (2005b; 2013) defines a “Thing” 
(Ding) as anything that draws interested entities together; as anything that assembles a 
group of actors to act together. Things are therefore matters of politics: something that 
invokes political practices. Latour (2005b) urges us to think about the names of Nordic 
parliaments: Stortinget (as “the big thing”) in Norway, Folketinget (as “the people’s 
thing”) in Denmark, Alþingi (as “the thing of all”) in Iceland, and Lagtinget (as “the thing 
of law”) in Åland. Things are issues that assemble people, and other things, as Latour 
(2005b, 13) concludes: “the Ding or Thing has for many centuries meant the issue that 
brings people together because it divides them.” Rather than being matters of fact, Things 
are matters of concern — issues that demand an assembly of a collective to discuss, al-
tercate and, perhaps, reach consolidation. Things are the many issues that incite a collec-
tive to collect propositions. They are, in other words, multiple. The term “Thing” leaves 
the configuration of the object up for debate: talking about Things rather than objects is 
a way of recognising that something clearly sparks an effect in a collective, but it is still 
unclear exactly what it is and what it does. It exists, but it is yet to be articulated into a 





Let me summarise this chapter. Several approaches to studying populism — among oth-
ers, the ideational approach — relies on some sort of representationalist notions of scien-
tific knowledge. The positivist notion of representationalism seeks to represent an inde-
pendent outside world, the “out there”, as faithfully and accurately as the methods in use 
are capable of representing. The ideational approach, for example, presumes that certain 
unmediated “populist attitudes” can be captured and measured without particular trans-
formation using certain quantitative methods (de la Torre and Mazzoleni 2019; Hawkins 
2019; Van Hauwaert et al. 2018). 
This sort of positivism has been criticised by social constructionists, who have argued 
that any representation of the out there is inherently social (Pinch and Bijker 1984; Shapin 
1995) — that is a construct with certain social bias and error (Bloor 1991; Jensen 2017; 
Law 2008). This move away from positivist representationalism is, however, not a move 
away from representationalism altogether, since claiming scientific knowledge to be 
“constitutively social” (Shapin 1995, 289) places everything “known” into the social do-
main, thus making the out there an empty and impossible artefact (Latour 1993). The 
social constructionist notion of representation is as inconceivable as the positivist one. 
Hence, what needs to happen to solve this representationalist dilemma is to escape the 
notions of representationalism altogether and replace it with the notions of performativity 
and multiplicity (Barad 2002; Mol 2002). However, this does not mean that representa-
tion does not exist. On the contrary, the notion of representation is a central standard for 
(positivist) knowledge production; it enacts knowledge as representation. Representation 
is an enactor. Instead of taking representation as a standard, we can now examine, just 
as with any other actor, how it is performed (Law 2008). Instead of lamenting about the 
social factors and errors contaminating our representations, we no longer expect anything 
to represent at all (Latour 1993). Instead of representing objects, we examine the practices 
that enact Things and actors (Latour 2005b). Instead of expecting accurate and singular 






This is a qualitative case study of the research practices of Cas Mudde (2010) in his study 
of populist attitudes, reported in the article “The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological 
Normalcy”. The focus of my methodology is on the practices of Mudde and his concep-
tualisation of populism as enacted by a multiplicity of human and nonhuman entities, 
rather than on the objects-in-themselves represented in his report. Or better put, the focus 
is on the objects as enactors rather than as essences.  
This is not a methodological critique, but an ontological critique, in the sense that this 
thesis promotes an ontological approach that is at odds with the representationalist ap-
proach, which is central to Mudde’s understanding of populism as measurable sets of 
attitudes. In other words, this is not a critique of Mudde personally nor his methodology 
per se, but a critique of the ontological presumptions that validate such methodological 
practices. Thus, the factuality of Mudde’s conclusions is not my concern, but how he has 
reached his conclusions. This is an “analytic issue focused” study of (political) science 
rather than a study in science — that is, a focus on how science is done around a certain 
topic, rather than how a methodologically proper populist study should be done (Bowden 
1995, 71).  The purpose is thus not only to describe what happens in Mudde’s study spe-
cifically, but also what might happen in similar ideational studies of “populist attitudes”.  
4.1 Research material 
My research material is first of all the article written by Mudde (2010) and a passage on 
the pages 1177–1178 particularly, on which he reports his findings about populist atti-
tudes in Europe. This passage, as my unit of analysis in the first part of my study, is a 
report on one of the three core features of his conceptualisation of the populist radical 
right (PRR). Prior to this specific passage, Mudde (2010) reports on attitudes regarding 
nativism and authoritarianism — the other two components of PRR. I will not focus on 
these two components since they are treated as separate features by Mudde (2007; 2010). 
It should also be noted that Mudde’s article “The Populist Zeitgeist” (2004) and book 





(2010) study and, consequently, my study. Mudde’s now famous definition of populism 
was first formulated in “The Populist Zeitgeist” (Mudde 2004) before being defined al-
most identically in his book “Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe” (Mudde 2007) 
and in “The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy” (Mudde 2010). 
This article by Mudde is one of his most referenced articles (according to Google Scholar) 
and it demonstrates well how his conceptualisation works in empirical practice. In addi-
tion, it is exemplary of the development of the ideational approach, which grew in popu-
larity later in the 2010’s, partly due to the operationality of Mudde’s conceptualisation. 
For my pilot study, I planned on comparing this study to other studies using other con-
ceptual approaches, or alternatively, granting more importance to Mudde’s earlier works 
(e.g. 2004; 2007), but I quickly realised that the just over one page passage produces more 
than enough practices for me to consider. Thus, I made the decision to make a case study 
of how entities from the Eurobarometer enact Mudde’s study, and vice versa. The fact 
that a one-page passage produces enough data for a Master’s thesis is indicative of how 
much is Othered in such representationalist measurements. 
Thus, I also analyse the specific Eurobarometer survey reports referenced in Mudde’s 
(2010) passage about populist attitudes in Europe. These Eurobarometer surveys are the 
Standard Eurobarometer surveys 52 (EB52) published in 2000, 59 (EB59) published in 
2003, 66 (EB66) published in 2007, 69 (EB69) published in 2008, and the Special Euro-
barometer surveys 245 (SEB245) published in 2006 and 291 (SEB291) published in 
2008. The Eurobarometer is the largest recurring public opinion survey in Europe and its 
database is one of the largest in the world. The Eurobarometer surveys are commissioned 
by the Directorate-General for Communication of the European Commission (formerly 
by “The Directorate-General for Education and Culture” and “The Directorate-General 
for Press and Communication”) and are carried out by INRA (Europe) European Coordi-
nation Office (EB52), European Opinion Research Group EEIG (EB59) and TNS Opin-
ion & Social (EB66, EB69, SEB245, SEB291). 
There are two different types of Eurobarometer surveys included in my analysis. Tradi-
tional Standard Eurobarometer surveys have recurring themes and sets of questions and 





European public opinion about standard issues related to the European Union. The Spe-
cial Eurobarometer surveys, however, are in-depth thematic surveys that measure the 
public opinion on more specific and current issues, such as on organised crime and cor-
ruption (SEB245; SEB291; Signorelli 2012). These themes along with their “contexts” 
are usually presented in the introductions to the Eurobarometer reports. 
The method of data collection used in the Eurobarometer surveys is a Computer Assisted 
Personal Interviewing (CAPI) (Höpner and Jurczyk 2015). This means that the inter-
viewer is present while the respondent answers a survey on an electronic device, such as 
a computer or a tablet. Approximately 1,000 respondents from each EU member state 
included in the survey at the time are interviewed in line with a questionnaire and a meth-
odology developed by the European Commission. The size of the country sample depends 
in part on the size of the country’s population and each respondent has to be at least 15 
years of age. 
All research material is either borrowed electronically from the Helsinki University Li-
brary or downloaded from respective public providers: Mudde’s (2010) article is down-
loaded from his public reserachgate.net -profile, while all Eurobarometer surveys are 
public documents and downloadable on ec.europa.eu. The material is read and analysed 
on my computer using the tools provided by Adobe Reader and Microsoft Excel. 
4.2 Method: allegorical praxiography 
The method of analysis of this study is not exactly a rigid method taken from a method-
ology textbook. Instead, it could be called an “allegorical praxiography”. My method for 
reading and analysing Mudde’s (2010) report on populist attitudes in Europe and the Eu-
robarometer surveys he references is heavily influenced by Annemarie Mol’s (2002) 
praxiographic work in the Dutch hospital referenced earlier, and John Law’s (2009) ar-
chaeological readings of the Eurobarometer surveys on “European citizens’ attitudes to 
farm animal welfare” (Law 2009, 240) from 2005 (Special Eurobarometer 229) and 2007 





Annemarie Mol’s (2002, 4) praxiography is what she calls an “exercise in empirical phi-
losophy”. The method is an ethnography with a twist: instead of observing people, actors, 
objects, cultures, traditions — or any other already established object or subject — the 
praxiographer observes all of these as practices. Everything, including people, is de-
scribed and defined as a result of sets of practices. The purpose is to describe an object 
by the practices that have enacted it and the practices it enacts, as Mol (2002) described 
the enacting of atherosclerosis and Latour (1999a) the soil of the Amazon forest. This is 
why the methodological premises of Mol’s praxiography provides the best possible tools 
to analyse the multiple practices that produce populism as a set of attitudes in Mudde’s 
study. Instead of focusing on what populism is, I am interested in how it is done. 
However, I will not be able to do a traditional “ethnography in practices” since I do not 
have access to real-time makings of populist attitudes. Instead, I will have to rely on the 
practices reported and manifested in the objects described in my research material litera-
ture. In fact, Mol (2002, 158) has hinted that this might be enough to discover something 
relevant. A praxiography in text does not allow me to follow the practices in action, rather 
only what the author of the text has chosen to include. This means that many of the prac-
tices that enact certain objects have gone unreported. 
This is not necessarily a problem, but it could be a possibility. What John Law (2004) 
means with the term “allegorical reading” is exactly this: to read a reportage knowing that 
some aspects are necessarily Othered; that some things are simplified in order for an ob-
ject to be translated into singular. I am only able to report with certainty on what has been 
reported by someone else — and this is the point. Everything else needs to be read alle-
gorically. First, the analyst recognizes the missing practices, that is, the black-boxed en-
tities which do not carry with them the practices that have enacted them as they travel 
from one literature to another. Then the analyst could go three different ways.  
The first option is accepting that these practices are Othered and that they are no longer 
present. If the analyst is not allowed to know what has been Othered, neither are other 
readers and hence the object is gradually black-boxed. Opening the black box has failed, 
but this already will reveal something about it — the fact that it hides something, and we 





work out the missing practices by reasoning what must have been done for this object to 
have been enacted as it has. This requires some presuming and is not the best way to reach 
certainty (whether certainty can be reached at all will be discussed later), but it might 
make the black box leak a bit by at least focusing on the object as a set of potential prac-
tices. This could be enough to reveal an object’s multiplicity, even if the exact practices 
remain Othered. The third option, if the circumstances allow, is to do an investigation 
into the practices. For example, when Mudde (2010) references a Eurobarometer survey, 
which happens to be a public report, it is possible for the analyst to analyse how the 
multiple entities have been enacted in the Eurobarometer survey report, and to follow 
how they are re-enacted as they travel to Mudde’s (2010) study. 
John Law’s (2009) “archaeological reading” of the Eurobarometer surveys 2005 and 2007 
serves as a great example of how such an allegorical praxiography in text could be done. 
By attempting a “Foucauldian archaeology”, Law (2009) describes the ways in which 
attitudes on farm animal welfare are enacted in the results of the Eurobarometer reports 
in five “layers”. This archaeological reading and the five layers it produces work as a 
frame of reference for my interpretation of my data, because it exemplifies well how to 
study objects as practices allegorically. My reading of Mudde (2010), as will become 
apparent soon, produces three layers of enactors, based on Law’s (2009) five layers and 
the central premises of the nonmodern ontology presented above. 
Annemarie Mol’s (2002) praxiography provides a methodological toolbox to studying 
objects as enacted through scientific practices, while Law’s (2004; 2009) allegorical and 
archaeological readings of text are great examples of how to study such practices without 
actually being present at the scene. Even though Mol (2002) and Law (2009) have made 
similar studies, neither of them have focused specifically on concepts. My focus in this 
thesis is on the concept of populism as simultaneously enacted and enacting. I am, in 
other words, applying a perspective on concepts as actors in their own right. This means 
that this study applies a nominalist understanding of concepts (Magetti, Gilardi and Ra-
daelli 2012), a premise that recognises that concepts are never right or wrong — they 





4.3 Research process 
The research process can be divided into three separate but partly overlapping readings. 
The first reading was a careful reading of Mudde’s (2010) article and the section (pages 
1177–1178) in which he analyses European populist attitudes. Here I analysed how the 
concept of populism as it has been defined re-enacts (translates) the attitudes that have 
travelled from the various Eurobarometer survey reports. This praxiographic reading of 
the populist attitudes underlined what kind of practices enact these attitudes and what is 
— or might be — Othered in the process. The first reading was accompanied with reading 
Mudde’s (2004; 2007) earlier works to understand the theoretical background of the con-
cept. The article was, first, read through once and then the chapter “The Attitudinal” 
(Mudde 2010, 1175–1178) was revisited a few times to get a proper understanding of my 
data. Here, in line with the praxiographic premises, I focused on how entities appear to 
have been done, rather than focusing on the objects themselves as matters of fact. 
The second reading regarded the Eurobarometer surveys and the data used by Mudde 
(2010), but as reported in the Eurobarometer surveys themselves. By returning to the 
“source” of Mudde’s data it is possible to recognize the objects yet to be translated as 
populist by Mudde and describe them as they have been enacted in the Eurobarometer. 
Here I focused on how Eurobarometer surveys work as inscription devices (Law 2004; 
2009): how the methods applied in the Eurobarometer enact the different actors present 
in the survey reports in order to be able to represent a “European public opinion”. I fo-
cused specifically on three central layers of enactors to the Eurobarometer surveys: the 
(human) actors, the issues and the locations of European public opinions. The second 
reading formed a dialogue between Mudde’s analysis and the Eurobarometer surveys, 
since I had to constantly control which particular sets of data Mudde references in which 
instances. 
Finally, the third reading concerned the specific statements made by Mudde (2010) to 
enact the populist attitudes in his study. The purpose of this reading was to retrace the 
multiplicity of entities (propositions) referenced by Mudde in his statements about the 





study. Here, rather than considering objects as changing between the Eurobarometer and 
Mudde’s (2010) report or being represented differently by Mudde, I focused on how 
Mudde actually re-enacts new objects of the data and the concepts he is working with. 
This reading was done in order to see if there are in fact multiple public opinions and 
whether Mudde’s practices have led to the inclusion of only one of these many potential 
propositions. These statements and propositions were listed in tables using Microsoft Ex-
cel and edited into more readable formats for the report (see Tables 1 and 2). 
These three steps produce new knowledge about how certain attitudes are enacted as pop-
ulism by ideational approach studies such as Mudde’s (2010). This analysis will also 
bring to light the multiplicity of human and nonhuman actors necessary for such an object 
to be enacted. My hope is that, even though this is a case study into a specific enactment 
of populism, the knowledge it produces is generalisable — or at least exemplary on an 
ontological level — to other studies applying similar ontological and methodological 
frameworks for studying “populism” or other analytical concepts. I do not claim that these 
same kind practices have occurred in similar ideational approach studies, or other quan-
titative measures of populism for that matter, but that these cases of science-making could 






5 Analysis: A multiple populism 
The following chapter is divided into three subsections, according to the order of analysis. 
I will first summarise Mudde’s article, “Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Nor-
malcy” (2010), and present the unit of analysis consisting of a one-page passage in which 
Mudde analyses populist attitudes using existing Eurobarometer survey data. Below, I 
present the central enactors and propositions to “trace back” to the Eurobarometer data. 
The purpose of this section is to lay the groundwork for the further analysis; that is to 
describe the central actors, issues and locations that are included in the passage and which 
enact “populism” in this specific study by Mudde (2010).  
5.1 Cas Mudde and the pathological normalcy thesis 
I will start with a short summary of Mudde’s article. The article has almost 600 citations 
on Google Scholar (as of May 2020) and is thus one of Mudde’s most cited academic 
articles5. Mudde (2010) presents two arguments for a paradigm shift in studies on Populist 
Radical Right Parties (PRRPs). The first is that the current paradigm, the normal pathol-
ogy thesis, fails to explain PRRPs success under empirical scrutiny. The normal pathol-
ogy thesis asserts that the success of PRRPs is explained by societal crises and social 
pathologies, that is, by pathological attitudinal changes as a result of these social crises. 
Mudde (2010) disagrees with this presumption and asserts that the success of PRRPs 
should rather be explained as a pathological normalcy: by the attitudes and the issues 
explaining the success of PRRPs being normal, not pathological, in (Western) European 
societies.  
Thus, the second argument is that scholars, in light of pathological normalcy, should fo-
cus on “supply-side factors” rather than “demand-side factors” in explaining the success 
 





of PRRP’s in Europe6. Since there are no pathological changes in society that could ex-
plain the success of PRRP’s, scholars should rather focus on “internal” explanations: how 
PRRP’s themselves have managed to overcome the struggles of the saliency of their is-
sues already existing in European societies. 
In order to argue for this said paradigm shift, Mudde (2010) needs empirically to demon-
strate that the attitudes and values attached to PRRP’s are already present in Europeans’ 
“normal” attitudes on current societal issues associated with PRRP’s. He does this by 
analysing attitudes associated with the three core features that he understands to be central 
to the populist radical right — nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde 2007) 
— in several Eurobarometer surveys conducted between 1997 and 2008, that is before 
and after the argued rise of PRRPs. Since I am here interested in the concept of populism, 
my focus is merely on the analysis of populist attitudes and the sources Mudde (2010) 
references in order to make statements about such populist attitudes. 
My unit of analysis in this section, strictly put, consists of a ca. one page long section in 
Mudde’s article (2010, 1177–1178), in which he analyses attitudes associated with pop-
ulism specifically. The sections dedicated to the other two features — nativism and au-
thoritarianism — will not be analysed here. Before analysing the passage about populist 
attitudes from Mudde’s (2010) study, it is a good idea to remind us about his definition 
of populism, formulated almost identically in “The Populist Zeitgeist” (2004), “Populist 
Radical Right Parties in Europe” (2007) and “The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological 
Normalcy” (2010): 
 
6 An attentive reader might notice that the ideational approach contrasts this argument. While this is true, 
both approaches study populist attitudes out there. Whereas the ideational approach focuses on how these 
out there -attitudes affect the demand for populist politics, Mudde (2010) focuses on how populist politics 
manages to capitalise on these same a priori attitudes (supply for populism). Both approaches presume such 
attitudes to exist ahead of both scientific measures and populist politics. Thus, as this thesis argues against 
such apriorism, this distinction will not affect the focus nor the argument of my study. Also, Mudde does 
not refer to the ideational approach in this article, presumably because it was written before the term “ide-
ational” became associated with populism (Hawkins 2019). However, Mudde is one of the central theorists 
in the development of the ideational approach, which theoretically and methodologically owe a lot to 





The third and final core feature is populism, which is here defined as an ideolog-
ical feature, and not merely as a political style. Accordingly, populism is under-
stood as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated 
into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the 
corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the vo-
lonté générale (general will) of the people. (Mudde 2007, 23.) 
Since my unit of analysis is short enough to be presented in its full length here, I will 
present below the passage in which Mudde’s analyses the “populist attitudes” in order for 
the reader to get the best possible understanding of the data I am analysing here. As can 
be seen in the passage below, Mudde (2010) operationalises his definition of populism 
by analysing “anti-elite” and “anti-establishment” attitudes. 
The ideological feature of populism can only be studied through its anti-elite or 
anti-establishment side. As the booming literature on Politikverdrossenheit has 
argued, and partly proven, growing groups of EU citizens hold negative attitudes 
towards the main institutions of their national democratic system, though not to 
the democratic system as such (cf. Dahl 2000). In fact, in 1999, 40 per cent of the 
EU-15 people were ‘not very satisfied’ or ‘not at all satisfied’ with their national 
democracy; ranging from 70 per cent in Italy to 22 per cent in the Netherlands 
(Eurobarometer 52, April 2000). Even though average satisfaction with democ-
racy fluctuates over time, and there is no clear Europe-wide downward trend in 
satisfaction (e.g. Wagner et al. 2009), surveys do show consistently that signifi-
cant minorities of Europeans are not very/at all satisfied with their national de-
mocracy. 
Similarly, trust levels of key democratic institutions are quite low. According to 
the Eurobarometer 66 (August 2006), the army is the most trusted institution (69 
per cent), followed by the police (66 per cent). The three least trusted institutions 
are the national parliament (33 per cent), the national government (30 per cent), 
and political parties (17 per cent). While there also some people with no opinion, 
the vast majority of EU citizens do not trust the main political institutions of their 
country. Notably, 58 per cent and 62 per cent ‘tend not to trust’ their national 
parliament and government, respectively (Eurobarometer 69, June 2008). And a 
staggering 75 per cent tend not to trust their political parties (Eurobarometer 59, 
April 2003). 
Regarding the issue of corruption, a prominent staple of populist radical right 
propaganda, the Special Eurobarometer 291 (‘The Attitudes of Europeans to-





totally agree or tend to agree that corruption is a major problem in their country. 
In countries like Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Romania some 75 per cent even 
‘totally agree’ with the statement. To be fair, there is a north–south divide here, 
as in Northern Europe only a minority believe that corruption is a major problem 
in their country: around a quarter in Denmark and Finland and just under half in 
Sweden and the Netherlands. 
According to the Special Eurobarometer 245 (‘Opinions on Organized, Cross-
National Border Crime and Corruption’), 59 per cent of the EU-25 believe that 
giving or receiving bribes is not successfully prosecuted. Of the categories of peo-
ple that are believed to be corrupt, ‘politicians at national level’ top the list, with 
60 per cent of the EU-25 respondents thinking they are corrupt; ranging from a 
low of 29 per cent in Denmark to a high of 69 per cent in Slovenia. Politicians at 
the regional level (47 per cent) and at the local level (45 per cent) are ranked 
fourth and fifth. Although the Special Eurobarometer 291 reports lower figures, 
they are still significant minorities of 46 per cent (national politicians) and 37 per 
cent (regional and local politicians). 
Finally, a specific target of populist radical right propaganda is the European Un-
ion, which is described as a thoroughly corrupt bureaucratic Moloch. Surveys 
show that this view is shared by a substantial majority of Europeans. The Special 
Eurobarometer 291 reports that no less than 66 per cent of citizens of the EU-27 
believe that corruption exists within EU institutions; which is actually down from 
71 per cent in 2005. Interestingly, the countries with the highest scores, Germany 
(81 per cent) and Sweden (80 per cent), score among the lowest with regard to 
corruption in their own country (though this is not a general relationship).  
(Mudde 2010, 1177–1178.) 
As can be seen above, quite a lot of different propositions crammed into a one-page de-
scription of populist attitudes in Europe. Mudde (2010) does not define populism but 
studies populist attitudes deductively: he employs an a priori concept to explain some-
thing that until now has not been regarded as populism (at least as Mudde defines popu-
lism). Mudde transforms non-populist elements as presented in the Eurobarometer into 
populist elements. He presents his findings in three central statements: “growing groups 
of EU citizens hold negative attitudes towards the main institutions of their national dem-
ocratic system”; “trust levels of key democratic institutions are quite low”; “a substantial 
majority of Europeans” think that there is corruption in either national or EU institutions 
(Mudde 2010, 1177–1178). Mudde presents in total twelve propositions to back up these 





are translated through Mudde’s methodological practices as the “anti-elite” and “anti-
establishment” sides of populism. 
Statement Proposition Source 
Growing groups of 
EU citizens hold 
negative attitudes 
towards the main 
institutions of their 
national democratic 
system 
EU-15 people are not satisfied with their national democracy EB52 (Dahl 2000) 
Trust levels of key 
democratic institu-
tions are quite low 
The army is the most trusted institution EB66 
The police is the second most trusted institution EB66 
EU citizens tend not to trust their political parties (least trusted) EB66 & EB59 
EU-citizens tend not to trust their national government (second least trusted) EB66 & EB69 
EU-citizens tend not to trust their national parliament (third least trusted) EB66 & EB69 
A substantial ma-
jority of Europeans 
think that there is 
corruption in either 
national or EU in-
stitutions 
EU-27 citizens agree that corruption is a major problem in their country SEB291 
EU-25 believe that giving or receiving bribes is not successfully prosecuted SEB245 
EU-25 respondents think that ‘politicians at national level’ are corrupt (the most) SEB245 & SEB291 
EU-25 respondents think that ‘politicians at regional level’ are corrupt (the fourth most) SEB245 & SEB291 
EU-25 respondents think that ‘politicians at local level’ are corrupt (the fifth most) SEB245 & SEB291 
EU-27 believe that corruption exists within EU institutions SEB291 
Table 1: The statements and the propositions of Mudde (2010) enacting populism in Europe. 
I call these entities included from the Eurobarometer propositions because they are not 
yet self-evidences, yet they need to be articulated in order for certain statements to be 
made. They collect different entities to be transformed into statements about the nature 
of populist attitudes (Latour 2004). The fact that they lack strict figurations in the Euro-
barometer (if they did not, they would travel very poorly) means that they are more suit-
able for translation than a priori well-articulated objects. For example, to say that “the 
police is the second most trusted institution in Europe” does not tell us much about pop-
ulism by itself, but it is enough to be translated together with other propositions into a 
statement about populism. 
For this sort of representativity to be possible, two methodological presumptions have to 
be met (Aldrin 2011; Signorelli 2012). First, there has to exist European attitudes out 
there, which may be described as anti-elite and anti-establishment attitudes. However, 
Mudde (2010) does not appear to study anti-elite or anti-establishment attitudes per se, 
but attitudes enacted by the Eurobarometer surveys yet to be associated with populism as 





Thus, we come to the second presumption: equivalency. None of the reported measures 
regard attitudes on either “anti-elite” or “anti-establishment” per se. Some translation 
work is needed. In the quote above, Mudde (2010, 1177) refers to the respondents’ satis-
faction with their national democracy as an indicator for the “negative attitudes towards 
the main institutions of their national democratic system”. Notice here, that “satisfaction 
with the national democracy” is not the same as “negative attitudes towards the main 
institutions of the national democratic system”. In the next section, Mudde (2010, 1177) 
reports that “trust levels of key democratic institutions are quite low”. Now he has turned 
his attention to trust. “Not to trust” is not the same as “not to be satisfied” nor “to have a 
negative attitude”. But these are translatable as belonging to the same set of attitudes 
called anti-establishment or anti-elite (to which of these two the attitudes belong is not 
clarified in the article). The two attitudinal sides of populism are in other words multiple 
(Mol 2002): enacted somewhat differently in different survey questions. 
Mudde (2010) does not analyse populism per se, nor anti-elite or anti-establishment atti-
tudes, but a multiple set of different entities translated as a singular ideological feature of 
PRR. He analyses populism as anti-elite and anti-establishment attitudes. Here are two 
entities. But populism grows even more in multiplicity. Anti-elite and anti-establishment 
attitudes are enacted by further multiplicities: satisfaction with national democracy; neg-
ative attitudes towards the main institutions; trust levels of “key democratic institutions” 
and the “main political institutions”; agreements on whether corruption is a problem in 
their country; belief in whether or not giving or receiving bribes is successfully prose-
cuted. Each of these entities seem to be enacted in relation to “populism”. It seems like 
the concept of populism is the common denominator here: it to collects a multiplicity of 
propositions. “Populism” is enacted from a mess into a set of propositions about many 
attitudes about many issues into one ideological feature (Figure 1). There are two things 
that are important to notice in this figure. First, each translation makes the entities fewer 
and better articulated until they have been black-boxed as an object (populism) at the 
bottom. Second, the arrows point into two directions: mess is not only gradiently articu-
lated — it is articulated by a priori concepts and issues. It is not a matter of a one-way 
movement: one needs not only to recognise how Mudde’s practices enact certain entities, 






























Figure 1: A mess is enacted as still uncertain and unorganised propositions about European attitudes. 
These are articulated further as statements about the mess: as slightly more certain and well-articulated 
issues. These statements are translated further as anti-elite and anti-establishment attitudes, which manifest 
the ideological feature of populism. 
The questions to be answered now are: What sort of actors are involved in this translation 
of the Eurobarometer results as populist attitudes? How do they affect the enactment of 
populism in this passage? Why are they associated with populism? Where do they enact 
and travel? I will attempt to answer these questions in three layers of enactors, each layer 
providing answers to some of the questions. 
The first layer of enactors regards the (human) actors involved. I write “human” in pa-
rentheses because even though actors are always hybrids of human and nonhuman actors 
(Latour 1999a), the nonhuman element travels in these cases through the human, who 
consequently becomes a nonhuman hybrid as well. This layer regards the actors, who on 
the face of it appear as human actors: Cas Mudde, the interviewers, the respondents, the 
EU-citizens, the politicians, the police, and so on. I will start from the most obvious one, 
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In order for a study to be made, it needs a researcher. It is quite safe to say that without 
Cas Mudde (2010) this study would not have been made. However, Mudde (2010) is not 
an independent actor by himself –– something must have enacted him. Some obvious 
enactors of Mudde are the institution he is working for, the funders of his research, the 
teachers and the funders of his education as a political scientist, possible uncredited co-
researchers and research assistants (Mudde uses the “we” pronoun), and so on. The list 
of potential enactors could be expanded almost infinitely. Most of these are however nec-
essarily Othered. Which (human) actors enact Mudde explicitly in the article? 
The version I have downloaded from Cas Mudde’s researchgate.net -profile has a short 
introduction of Cas Mudde which reveals that he works for the University of Georgia. 
The article is published in West European Politics, volume 33, number 6, published by 
Routledge, owned by Taylor & Francis Group. Mudde does not use his own data but 
relies on the Eurobarometer surveys conducted by the European Commission. Mudde 
would not be the Mudde enacted in the article without the thousands of actors enacting 
the institutions and publishers above7.  
But Mudde is still not an actor unless he acts. So, what does he do? He analyses surveys. 
He researches and he writes. He studies the specific enactments of attitudes presented in 
the Eurobarometer surveys as propositions to his statements about the pathological nor-
malcy of populism. The Eurobarometer, on the other hand, is commissioned by the Eu-
ropean Commission: an institution enacted by millions of actors. The Eurobarometer sur-
veys present the responses of an undisclosed number of respondents interviewed by in-
terviewers presented in graphs, numbers, percentages and text. Notice that, in the very 
first lines of the passage presented above, Mudde (2010, 1177)  refers to the EU citizens 
as holders; they “hold” negative attitudes: “As the booming literature on Poli-
tikverdrossenheit has argued, and partly proven, growing groups of EU citizens hold neg-
ative attitudes towards the main institutions of their national democratic system” (the 
 
7 Bruno Latour (1999, 98–108) has written a descriptive passage about how each “scientific fact” is de-
pendent on huge networks of “allies”, “colleagues”, “instruments” and “publics” (to present the fact to) in 






second emphasis added). The respondents are the holders of attitudes, neither of which 
can exist without the other: without respondents, there can be no access to attitudes; with-
out attitudes, there are no responses that would make the respondent a respondent — as 
in someone who responds. More about the respondents and the interviewers follows in 
section 5.2. 
What about the non-human objects? They enact Mudde too. Hence, we come to our sec-
ond layer: issues. Namely, without “populism” there could not be a study of populism. 
Populism exists because it produces effects. Mudde, among many other political scien-
tists, has recognized this existence of populism. However, here populism is not an issue 
in the singular, but it is a multiplicity of issues: satisfaction with democracy, trust in 
democratic institutions and corruption among key political actors, all translated as issues 
of anti-elite and anti-establishment attitudes. Just as populism, these exist too, since they 
enact populism and the multiplicity of actors associated with populism. They exist as 
collectives (Latour 2004). 
But why do precisely these issues enact this conception of populism? Mudde (2010, 1175) 
references the attitudes presented in the Eurobarometer because it “is not only the only 
regular EU-wide socio-political survey, but it has also shown a particular interest in issues 
and values of relevance to this study.” Mudde references the Eurobarometer attitudes, 
first, because Eurobarometer surveys might be the best source for European attitudes 
Mudde can get. Mudde (2007) has previously regretted that questionnaires he sent to dif-
ferent PRRP’s did not provide any proper responses. Getting PRRP’s excited, as a liberal 
scholar representing an intellectual “elite”, about an extensive study of PRR is for sure 
not an easy task. For this reason, it might have been easier to study attitudes yet to be 
labelled as “populist”. The first reason is a reason of convenience. The second reason is 
that the issues and attitudes presented in the Eurobarometer surveys are translatable, that 
is, “of relevance to” Mudde’s study. Since populism is defined as a combination of anti-
elite and anti-establishment attitudes, these are said to be equivalent to the issues pre-
sented in the Eurobarometer surveys. 
This all needs to happen somewhere, hence the third and final layer: locations. These 





Mudde’s (2010) study, is Europe — he nevertheless studies populism as a pathological 
normalcy in Europe. Since the Eurobarometer is “the only regular EU-wide socio-politi-
cal survey” (Mudde 2010, 1175), “Europe” is confined due to methodological restrictions 
to the EU — the second level. However, there are several EUs in play here. Mudde (2010) 
refers to “EU-15 people”, “EU-25 respondents”, “EU-27 citizens” and to “a substantial 
majority of Europeans” (Mudde 2010, 1177–1178). Europe — enacted as the holder of 
Mudde’s data — not only changes in size from consisting of 15 member states to 27 
members states, but varies in time as well: EU-15 is enacted by the Eurobarometer 52 
and 59 in 1999 and 2003 respectively, while EU-27 is enacted by the Special Euroba-
rometer 291 and Eurobarometer 69 in 2007 and 2008. Despite this, Mudde is able to refer 
to “Europe” and the “EU” as singular entities. 
The third level makes a distinction between Northern and Southern Europe: “there is a 
north–south divide here, as in Northern Europe only a minority believe that corruption is 
a major problem in their country” (Mudde 2010, 1177). Europe is here divided into two, 
not only according to the cardinal directions, but according to the belief in whether cor-
ruption is a major problem8. Then there is the fourth level included in Mudde’s (2010) 
report: singular countries, namely Netherlands, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Romania, 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Slovenia and Germany. These are, however, only included 
because they have been member states of the European Union at the time of the respective 
Eurobarometer survey. Fifth level: national, regional and local levels. Mudde (2010) dis-
cusses politicians on different levels as different politicians enacted according to how 
corrupt “EU25 respondents” think they are. Sixth and final level: institutions such as gov-
ernments and parliaments. These are after all not only institutions, but the locations where 
the corrupt politicians practice their corruption.  
 
8 Even if it is not articulated as such in my data, this division between North and South is above all a 
historical division based on cultural, religious and socio-political dynamics, which still plays a role in EU-
politics. For example, during the economic crash in 2008, it was common for Northern European politicians 
to blame Southern European countries for the recession. More recently, during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
a Dutch minister blamed Southern European countries for failing to cope with the economic shock caused 
by the virus. This kind of maintaining of a North-South divide does affect how Eurobarometer results are 





Read allegorically, we could add to this list even more locations that have been Othered: 
the homes of the respondents; the office(s) where Eurobarometer surveys are analysed; 
Mudde’s office either at home or at his university; the computer screens that present the 
responses to the surveys; the home page of the Eurobarometer on the internet; the postal 
offices and the hands of the postal workers who deliver the interview invitations to the 
(soon-to-be) respondents’ homes. The list is virtually never-ending. 
These different locations — either clearly articulated or read allegorically — are im-
portant to recognize in order to grant the practices and the knowledges they produce a 
“situatedness” (Haraway 1988); to present them as not only matters of linguistics or as 
mere textual practices, but as matters enacting practices, located and situated, somewhere 
(Barad 2003; Mol 2002). They are not objective knowledges represented by an objective 
political researcher, neither are they mere social constructs or artefacts presented in text, 
but real enacting entities produced, re-enacted and translated by someone somewhere. 
These practices have, one way or another, travelled from these locations to the passage in 
Mudde’s (2010) article, via inscription devices and Eurobarometer reports. These are the 
locations in which the Eurobarometer, the issues, Mudde and his study, anti-elite and anti-
establishment attitudes, and populism are enacted. But somewhere along the way, these 
propositions are black-boxed as independent objects in and by themselves, no longer at-
tached to these particular locations, issues, actors and practices. 
“Populism”, as enacted by Mudde (2010), appears to be collecting multiple enactors, mul-
tiple issues and multiple locations, all coming together to produce multiple propositions 
and statements. We may conclude at this point that 1) Mudde’s (2010) practices are de-
pendent on reading the attitudes reported in the Eurobarometer surveys as attitudes out 
there; 2) the attitudes in the Eurobarometer surveys as reported by Mudde did not include 
the object of populism itself, but rather attitudes translated as manifesting its “ideological 
feature”; 3) much of what has been previously done in the Eurobarometer surveys in order 
to enact the issues associated with Mudde’s conceptualisation of populism has been Oth-
ered either by Mudde or in the making of the Eurobarometer surveys; 4) the concept of 
populism and the manner in which it is defined does seem to determine what is collected: 





5.2 Enacting the Eurobarometer 
In the previous section the focus of the analysis was on the object of populism in Mudde’s 
study as presented in the article, “The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy” 
(2010). Since Mudde’s analysis depends on the data produced in the Eurobarometer, the 
next step in order to describe the multiple entities enacting Mudde’s populism is to trace 
these entities back to their previous home. 
There is already a wide range of critique directed towards the Eurobarometer by research-
ers in science (e.g. Aldrin 2010; 2011; Höpner and Jurczyk 2015; Signorelli 2012). This 
critique focuses especially on two aspects: the methodological issues with the Euroba-
rometer, and its political function as a “governance instrument” (Aldrin 2011; Signorelli 
2012). The “sociological criticism” pointed towards the methods of the Eurobarometer is 
in line with the sociological criticism towards surveys and opinion polling in general, 
initiated by Pierre Bourdieu and Philippe Champagne (Signorelli 2012). It reviews in 
particular two methodological premises that make possible the very existence of public 
opinion surveys.  
The first is the premise of universality: in order for an opinion about an issue to be in-
scribed and measured, opinions about the issues must be assumed to exist in the first 
place, and the issues must be universal enough to be understood the same way by different 
respondents. The second premise regards equality: while each respondent has a certain 
opinion about a certain issue ahead of the survey, the opinion must also be relatable to 
every other opinion and provide the possibility to be weighted by age, gender, social sta-
tus, and so on (Aldrin 2011; Signorelli 2012). These two premises have been frequently 
criticised by sociologists. For example, it is unreasonable to assume that each respondent 
is as familiar as the others (or at all familiar) with certain political concepts used to meas-
ure attitudes about political issues; yet, by quantifying the responses as both universal and 
equal, such differences in political awareness are completely left unattended. The fact 
that political awareness is not distributed evenly across the European population means 





has argued: “the probability of producing a political response to a politically constituted 
question rises as one moves up the social hierarchy”.  
The political function of the Eurobarometer is summarised by Aldrin (2010) into three 
central goals. First is the “symbolic creation” of an “European public opinion”, that is, 
the enactment of the European community as a “romanticised whole” homogenised as 
holders of opinions on certain European issues that can be quantified in numbers, charts 
and percentages (Aldrin 2010; Law 2009). The second goal is to use this data as a justi-
fication for ongoing EU projects and to present the European Union as an organisation in 
search of “an enhanced culture of consultation and dialogue with citizens” and conse-
quently practicing a “reformed European governance based on ‘participation’” (Signorelli 
2012, 32). The third goal is the legitimisation of the European Commission as the central 
EU institution communicating with member states, as it is the only institution with a suf-
ficient level of knowledge about the respective countries (Aldrin 2010). According to 
Aldrin (2011) and Signorelli (2012), the Eurobarometer surveys are hybrid instruments: 
not only scientific instruments, but political tools used for governance by the European 
Commission. 
Despite this critique of opinion surveys pointed at the Eurobarometer by critical sociolo-
gists and researchers in science, and its relevance to this thesis, I wish to reiterate that my 
analysis is not intended to add to such a methodological critique. Many of the students 
from the critical tradition presented above do after all base their critique on social con-
structionist notions of knowledge production, as they question opinion surveys’ capabil-
ity to represent the European population and its political opinions. They tend to focus on 
the “errors” (Bloor 1991) of knowledge production. On the contrary, we need to escape 
the notion of representation altogether. From a nonmodern perspective, criticism of the 
accuracy of representations becomes empty, since such a capability (successful or not) 
cannot exist a priori: it too has to be performed. 
Hence, my analysis of the Eurobarometer surveys will describe the enactment of three 
layers of enactors of the attitudes “represented” by Mudde (2010). These three layers are 
1) (human) actors (respondents, interviewers), 2) issues and 3) locations. Here the focus 





issues and locations. Before continuing with the analysis, I want to present a question and 
the respective results as reported in the Eurobarometer 52 (conducted in 1999). This par-
ticular question and enactment of an attitude is an example to which I will return during 
the analysis below. The question is documented in the annexes to the survey and the re-
sults in the report. 
The question: 
1.10 – SATISFACTION WITH NATIONAL DEMOCRACY (% by country). 
Question EN: 
On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at 
all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)? 
(EB52 Annexes, B.17) 
The results: The Eurobarometer 52 reports that 56 percent of the EU15 respondents are 
“Very satisfied” or “fairly satisfied” with the way democracy works in their country, 
whereas 40 percent of EU15 respondents are “not very satisfied” or “not at all satisfied”. 
The “don’t knows” are not shown in the report, but one may assume from the remaining 
percentages that their proportion is four percent. What is also Othered in the report is the 
proportion of “very satisfied” contra “fairly satisfied” in the reported 56 percent, and the 
proportion of “not very satisfied” contra “not at all satisfied” in the reported 40 percent.  
Luckily, I have access to the annexes. In the annexes, after searching for a while for the 
correct question, I find that indeed four percent of the respondents have answered “don’t 
know”. 11 percent have answered “not at all satisfied”, 29 percent “not very satisfied”, 
48 percent “fairly satisfied” and, finally, eight percent have answered “very satisfied”. 
Layer one: (human) enactors 
The Eurobarometer surveys are “public opinion surveys” (EB52, i); they measure opin-
ions and attitudes held by a European public. This public, as the population of Europe, is 
represented by samples (N≈16 000) of “EU citizens” or “European citizens”, enacted as 
“respondents” in the surveys. After reading the Eurobarometer reports allegorically, with 
a focus on the enacting practices, one may summarise at least the following four condi-





First, there are no respondents without questions to respond to. These questions partly 
determine the conditions by which the respondent is enacted. The respondent becomes a 
respondent by responding in particular ways to particular questions. If a respondent fails 
to respond to a particular question, (s)he is excluded from the respective data in the report. 
Second, someone needs to ask the respondents the questions. The questions are written 
on an electronic questionnaire which is filled with the respondent’s answers, with the help 
of an interviewer. In case the respondent does not understand the question or the multiple-
choice answers, the interviewer helps to translate and explain them to the respondent. The 
interviewer is a mediator between the respondent and the questionnaire. Third, the re-
spondents must be presumed to have answers to the questions asked, that is, an opinion 
or attitude about a certain issue presented in the questionnaire. The respondent, in order 
to be enacted as such, needs to be enacted a holder of a priori attitudes to report. Without 
such a priori attitudes, no link can be made between a “European public opinion” out 
there and the survey data in here. Fourth and finally, there needs to be issues concerning 
the respondent in order for him or her to have an opinion or attitude about it. I will de-
scribe here how the first three of these conditions are fulfilled in practice. The fourth 
condition will be discussed under the layer “issues”. 
The respondents respond to a set of questions listed and coded in questionnaires. Without 
these questions, there would be no responses and subsequently no respondents. In EB52 
(EB52 Annexes, B.17), for example, the following question is asked: “On the whole, are 
you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way 
democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)?” If this question were not asked, there would 
be no way of knowing whether the respondents even have an opinion about this particular 
issue. 
Respondents are, by being asked the question above, enacted as having one of the follow-
ing five answers: “very satisfied”, “fairly satisfied”, “not very satisfied”, “not at all satis-
fied” or “don’t know”. If a respondent fails to answer one of these five options, (s)he 
ceases being a respondent to the particular question. A respondent, in regard to this issue 
in particular, is a European citizen who holds and reports an attitude about his or her 





know”. By giving the respondent preformulated options for answers to preformulated 
questions, the questionnaire, with the help of the interviewer, enacts the respondent. The 
questionnaire makes someone, who might have earlier been a “father”, a “pharmacist”, or 
a “millionaire”, become for a moment a “respondent” with an answer. The respondent-
with-an-attitude is then re-enacted as a unit in a statistical analysis. The respondent ceases 
being a person answering a question and becomes a number or part of a percentage rep-
resenting a (ideal) type of an attitude. This percentage is finally turned into a text articu-
lating a statement about the European public opinion about national democracies. The 
respondent and the interviewer, as the enactors of the attitude, have been successfully 
Othered; what remains is a percentage, a graph and a text representing a public opinion. 
Layer two: issues 
This type of a representation of a “European public opinion” is only possible if we assume 
there to be such a public opinion in the first place (Aldrin 2011; Signorelli 2012). Re-
spondents need to have certain attitudes about certain issues ahead of the interview. There 
has to exist attitudes out there, among the “European public”, to be represented by the 
respondents in the Eurobarometer report. But from our performative ontology, such an a 
priori out there is impossible (Latour 1999a; Law 2004). Rather, what needs to happen is 
an enactment of the respondent as a holder of certain attitudes about certain issues. 
Each Eurobarometer report has certain themes. These themes along with their contexts 
are usually presented in the introductions to the Eurobarometer reports. For example, in 
the introduction to the Eurobarometer 59 (2003), the authors ask the reader to take into 
account the offensive against the regime of Saddam Hussein, launched by the United 
States and their allies, when interpreting the results of the survey. In the introduction to 
the Eurobarometer 69 (2008), the authors warn that the “persistent turmoil in financial 
markets” and the “surging inflation rates” has had a negative impact on “consumer con-
fidence in the EU”. Such contexts are set not only to give the reader a better understanding 
of the report, but also to relate the issues in the survey to events out there, in the world 





These themes and issues are defined in advance and printed on the questionnaires. They 
are then presented to the respondent, through the questionnaire, as issues to have opinions 
about. For a moment, the respondent becomes interested and invested in enacting the 
issue further by having an opinion about it. By asking the respondent a question about a 
certain issue and giving the respondent a certain number of available attitudes to choose 
from, the respondent is enacted as a holder of a certain attitude about a certain issue. It 
does not matter whether or not the respondent has been interested in the respective issue 
before the interview: the issue, as a Thing (Latour 2005b), is always present and enacting 
in the questionnaire. The attitudes are enacted through the questionnaire always in rela-
tion to an issue. No connection needs to exists between issues out there and attitudes in 
here ahead of the survey, since both move through the same mediator: the questionnaire. 
There are no attitudes nor a public opinion about a national democracy, unless national 
democracy is enacted as an issue in the survey. The interviewer asks not “on the whole, 
about what are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied?” 
but specifies that this is a matter of your national democracy specifically. The issue thus 
determines what the attitude soon-to-be presented by the respondent is going to be. What-
ever the respondent answers now is an attitude about his or her national democracy. It 
does not matter whether or not the respondent ever thought about his or her national de-
mocracy as an issue in this particular sense before this particular event — the respondent 
is enacted as having such an attitude now; not before, not after, but at the very moment 
of the interview. The survey does not need to take into account whether or not an attitude 
ever existed, as it ends up existing in the questionnaire, ahead of the interview: all that 
matters is to have the respondent choose between four attitudes and one “don’t know”. 
The questionnaire replaces the out there, because the only access to attitudes is through 
the questionnaire. The questionnaire is not an intermediary between out there -attitudes 
and an in here -survey, but a mediator (Latour 2005a) and an inscription device (Law 
2004): an actor in its own right performing the attitudes and the issues as existing out 





Layer three: locations 
At least five different levels of locations can be found in the Eurobarometer reports. First, 
the location of the interview. There is no information about the exact locations in which 
the interviews have been held (to protect the anonymity of the respondents), but the im-
portant thing is to recognize allegorically that they have been held somewhere. It could 
be at the respondent’s home or in an office meant for conducting the interviews. In tradi-
tional sociology, this level could be called “micro”.  
The second level is the particular territories in which the interviews are conducted. The 
size and the amount of territories included in the different Eurobarometer surveys vary. 
The continent of Europe is a relatively large territory. The borders of the European Union, 
on the other hand, draw another large but slightly smaller territory, since not all European 
states are members of the European Union. These EU member states determine the size 
of the territory of the European Union not only in space but in time as well. As noted 
earlier, the territory of EU grows in time, from comprising 15 member states before 2004 
to comprising 27 member states by 2007. There is a multiplicity of European Unions at 
play here: each of them is as much as the other a “European Union”, but still radically 
different in size and content. 
But there are also a few territories that the Eurobarometer surveys do not include fully — 
countries that enact the context of the survey but are not included in the samples nor the 
results. The United States, its allies and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq enact the Eu-
robarometer 59, as they are recognised in the survey as the central actors in the Iraq War, 
to which the results of the survey are directly associated (EB59). Kosovo is another indi-
rect enactor: it is included in the context for the Eurobarometer 52.  
In the spring of 1999, levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works in the 
respective Member States were significantly more positive than those obtained a 
year earlier. The two factors that were offered as explanations for this significant 
improvement were the war in Kosovo and media coverage of elections in the 





The United States, its allies, Iraq and Kosovo affect how the results of the surveys are 
interpreted and explained, thus enacting the issues and attitudes presented in the surveys: 
the changes in the satisfaction levels with democracy in 1999 is explained by a war hap-
pening in Kosovo (EB52). 
The third level: as in Mudde’s article, the Special Eurobarometer 291 divides Europe 
into Northern and Southern Europe, in order to demonstrate a “North-South divide in 
public opinion” on the issue of whether corruption is a major problem in the European 
countries. The fourth level: the member states create a collective called the European 
Union. This level of location is the totality of all EU member states comprised in the 
survey. Once again, this is not only a matter of a geographical territory, but an organisa-
tion — an assemblage of several member states brought together by common issues 
(Things). As noted already several times, this assemblage grows in time: increasingly 
more interested nations are accepted as members in this collective9. 
But what is the European Union if not a union of European countries? Hence the fifth 
level of location: Europe. The difference between “EU” (15, 25 and 27) and “Europe” is 
often blurred in the Eurobarometer, as in Mudde’s study. As the surveys measure only 
samples from the EU’s of the time (and from some additional territories), they also make 
Europe change in size and content, creating a multiplicity of European territories. For 
example, the introduction to the Eurobarometer 52 (2000) begins with the words “This 
52nd Eurobarometer Report presents the views of European citizens towards the Euro-
pean Union in the autumn of 1999” (EB52, vii, my emphasis). Not “EU15 citizens”, but 
“European citizens”. Europe and European citizenship are right in the first sentence of 
the report reduced to the 15 member states of 1999. 
Europe and the EU do not only comprise a territory, but an imagined community as well 
(Anderson 1991, Law 2009). The Eurobarometer not only measures the “public opinion” 
 
9 On the other hand, following the unprecedented Brexit referendum in June 2016, the size of EU may also 
decrease. However, the United Kingdom is not the first member to withdraw from a European institution. 
Algeria (upon independence) left the EU predecessor EC (European Communities) in 1962, Greenland left 
the EEC (European Economic Community) in 1985 and Saint-Barthélemy ceased having the status of an 





of EU citizens but performs Europeanness. As the Eurobarometer reports what the atti-
tudes of Europeans are, they define what is to be “European”. Europe is not only enacted 
as a certain geographical and continental space, but as a community of Europeans with 
homogeneous European attitudes. Europeans are enacted as either having certain atti-
tudes about certain issues or not. Europe is not only a continent, but a holder of a public 
with opinions. The European public is performed to hold attitudes, ready to be collected 
by the survey. 
This imagined community of Europe comprises all the other levels above: almost every-
thing that happens in the survey happens in Europe. But not everything. Europe, as en-
acted in the Eurobarometer, does not only enact the European public, but the United States 
and Iraq as well. By making a difference to what Europeanness is by enacting European 
attitudes, these territories are enactors of Europeanness. They become a part of the Euro-
pean collective of attitudes. To conclude, there is a multiplicity of Europes: Europes as 
geographical territories of different size (EU15, EU25, EU27 and all the additional asso-
ciated territories), Europes of different times (1999, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008), 
and Europes as different but homogenized communities comprised of a multiplicity of 
different attitudes from different samples, locations and times. 
5.3 Re-enacting statements 
Now that I have illustrated how an attitude is enacted in the Eurobarometer, let us see 
how these kinds of enactments travel to Cas Mudde’s (2010) study of populism as a 
“pathological normalcy”. As discussed above, these mute entities have been made to 
speak by the surveys (Latour 2004). Out there, they are invisible and untraceable — they 
might not even exist as attitudes at all, as social psychological constructs, or as anything 
for that matter, since they are only enacted as beings in the survey. The only way of 
“capturing” these creatures, presumed to reside out there, is by enacting the out there with 
an inscription device (Law 2004), such as the questionnaire. Whether or not such attitudes 
exist ahead of the surveys is now irrelevant: the surveys make them exist anyway. Cas 
Mudde (2010) uses his own description devices and methods to translate something, that 





in a domain out there to be represented by a survey, neither does populism: it needs to be 
enacted to act upon others.  
Mudde (2010) makes three statements using in total twelve propositions in his passage 
about populist attitudes, using the data from the various Eurobarometer surveys refer-
enced in his article in order to enact his conception of populism as a pathological nor-
malcy (table 2). The three statements are: “growing groups of EU citizens hold negative 
attitudes towards the main institutions of their national democratic system”; “trust levels 
of key democratic institutions are quite low”; “a substantial majority of Europeans” think 
that there is corruption in either national or EU institutions (Mudde 2010, 1177–1178). 
These three statements translate the attitudes that have travelled from the Eurobarometer 
surveys to Mudde’s study into anti-elite and anti-establishment attitudes. I will now re-
view each statement in turn in order to trace how it has been enacted in the Eurobarome-
ter, and how it has travelled to and been translated by Mudde’s study. 
Attitudes (Europeans…) EB52 EB59 EB66 EB69 SEB245 SEB291 
are not satisfied with their national democracy (not very/not at all satisfied) 40 % 40 % - - - - 
tend to trust their army (tend to trust) - 66 % 69 % 70 % - - 
tend to trust their police (tend to trust) - 67 % 64 % 63 % - - 
tend not to trust their political parties (tend to trust) - 16 % 17 % 18 % - - 
tend not to trust their political parties (tend not to trust) - 75 % - 76 % - - 
tend not to trust their national government (tend to trust) - 37 % 30 % 32 % - - 
tend not to trust their national government (tend not to trust) - 53 % - 62 % - - 
tend to trust their national parliament (third least trusted) - 42 % 33 % 34 % - - 
tend not to trust their national parliament - 46 % - 58 % - - 
agree that corruption is a major problem in their country (totally agrees/tend to agree) - - - - 72 % 75 % 
believe that giving or receiving bribes is not successfully prosecuted - - - - 59 % 58 % 
think that politicians at national level are corrupt (the most) - - - - 54 % 46 % 
think that politicians at regional level are corrupt (the fourth most) - - - - 47 % 37 % 
think that politicians at local level are corrupt (the fifth most) - - - - 45 % 37 % 
think that the EU is corrupt (corruption exists in European institutions) - - - - 71 % 66 % 
Table 2: Listed on the left are the attitudes that have travelled from the Eurobarometer surveys to Mudde’s 
(2010) passage about populism. The texts inside brackets indicate how the question has been formulated 
in the survey. On the right of the attitudes are the many enactments of the same attitude in the different 
Eurobarometer surveys. The percentages in green are the enactments included in Mudde’s (2010) enact-
ment of populism. The percentages in red have been Othered in Mudde’s (2010) report. The empty spaces 
indicate that the question (the attitude) has not been included in the specific Eurobarometer survey. 
A short disclaimer before the review. First, I would like to state that nowhere in any of 
the Eurobarometer reports do the words “populism” or “populist” appear. It seems to be 
that none of the Eurobarometer surveys included in Mudde’s study have enacted “popu-
lism” per se as they have been reported. Second, I would like to state that it is not my 





this re-view is to study allegorically what Mudde appears to have done and what kind of 
enactors these practices have enacted, and not to evaluate the accuracy of Mudde’s work.  
Statement one: Growing groups of EU citizens are not satisfied 
with their national democracy 
The ideological feature of populism can only be studied through its anti-elite or 
anti-establishment side. As the booming literature on Politikverdrossenheit [po-
litical apathy] has argued, and partly proven, growing groups of EU citizens hold 
negative attitudes towards the main institutions of their national democratic sys-
tem, though not to the democratic system as such [– –]. In fact, in 1999, 40 per 
cent of the EU-15 people were ‘not very satisfied’ or ‘not at all satisfied’ with 
their national democracy; ranging from 70 per cent in Italy to 22 per cent in the 
Netherlands (Eurobarometer 52, April 2000). (Mudde 2010, 1177.) 
In the statement above, the results from the Eurobarometer 52 represent the political ap-
athy (Politikverdrossenheit) that is translated as the anti-elite and anti-establishment sides 
of the ideological feature of populism. In fact, there are several statements in the passage 
above merged into one: dissatisfaction with democracy is an indicator of populism. 
Eurobarometer 52 (2000, 12) reports that 40 percent of the EU15-respondents reported 
being “not very satisfied” or “not at all satisfied” “with the way democracy works in their 
country”. Mudde (2010, 1177), on the other hand, associates this dissatisfaction with 
holding negative attitudes “towards the main political institutions of their national dem-
ocratic system, though not to the democratic system as such”, which, taken separately, is 
not the same entity as the one enacted in the Eurobarometer 52. This is associated further 
with “political apathy”, “anti-establishment” and “anti-elite”. By simultaneously associ-
ating political apathy with populism and the dissatisfaction of EU-15 people, Mudde 
(2010) translates “dissatisfaction with the national democracy” as an indicator for the 
anti-elite and anti-establishments sides of populism. 
The proportion of respondents dissatisfied with their democracy is reported as the same 
in both the Eurobarometer 52 (2000) and 59 (2003). Both reports enact a dissatisfied 
European minority of 40 percent. The question regarding satisfaction with the national 





Statement two: Trust levels of key democratic institutions are low 
Similarly, trust levels of key democratic institutions are quite low. According to 
the Eurobarometer 66 (August 2006), the army is the most trusted institution (69 
per cent), followed by the police (66 per cent). The three least trusted institutions 
are the national parliament (33 per cent), the national government (30 per cent), 
and political parties (17 per cent). While there also some people with no opinion, 
the vast majority of EU citizens do not trust the main political institutions of their 
country. Notably, 58 per cent and 62 per cent ‘tend not to trust’ their national 
parliament and government, respectively (Eurobarometer 69, June 2008). And a 
staggering 75 per cent tend not to trust their political parties (Eurobarometer 59, 
April 2003). (Mudde 2010, 1177) 
There are at least five propositions to Mudde’s statement “trust levels of key democratic 
institutions are quite low”: the army is the most trusted democratic institution (69 per-
cent); the police is the second most trusted (66 percent); the national parliament is the 
third least trusted (33 percent); the national government is the second least trusted (30 
percent); the political parties is are the least trusted (17 percent). Here, as a minor side 
note before continuing with the analysis itself, it should be clarified that the Eurobarom-
eter 66 (2006) reports the trust in the police as 64 percent and not as 66 percent as reported 
by Mudde. This, I believe, is a simple and honest mistake, but it does add to the mess. 
The question stated in the questionnaire is: “[QA6.] I would like to ask you a question 
about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institu-
tions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?” (EB66, 64). The per-
centages that have travelled to Mudde’s study thus include those respondents who an-
swered “tend to trust” for the institution in question. However, the percentages included 
by Mudde only appear as such in the Eurobarometer 66; other Eurobarometer surveys 
report different numbers. The Eurobarometer 59 (2003), for example, reports that 66 per-
cent tend to trust their army and 67 percent tend to trust their police, making the police 
the most trusted institution, contrary to what Mudde reports. Whereas Mudde (2010, 
1177) reports that “58 per cent and 62 per cent ‘tend not to trust’ their national parliament 
and government, respectively (Eurobarometer 69, June 2008)”, Eurobarometer 59 re-
ports that only 46 percent tend not to trust their parliament and 53 percent tend not to 





The standard explanation of these differing numbers is that the attitudes have changed, 
as is the case in Eurobarometer 52 (2000, 12, my emphasis): “In the spring of 1999, levels 
of satisfaction with the way democracy works in the respective Member States were sig-
nificantly more positive than those obtained a year earlier.” However, given our golden 
rule that no entity is an entity by itself, talking only about a change is problematic, be-
cause it would erase the context set in the introductions to the reports and the different 
actors enacting the “public opinion” in different locations at different times. If we were 
to talk about the same object that has, however, changed in time, then we would make the 
multiplicity of enactors invisible. Talking about the trust levels from 2003 and 2008 as 
the same object does nothing but black-box it: we recognize the change itself, but not the 
actors enacting the change. “Trust in institutions” becomes a thing in itself, rather than 
an “actor-enacted” (Law and Mol 2008). If there indeed is a change, then the being at the 
beginning and at the end of the “change” cannot be the same entity, since it is enacted as 
a different entity by different enactors at different times. A better metaphor could be 
“metamorphosis”: the entities do not only change — they are reproduced with new fig-
urations. There is a multiplicity of one, albeit a re-enacted public opinion. 
The fact that the Eurobarometer 59 and 69 report such different numbers is a strong in-
dicator that something has indeed happened between 2003 and 2008 that has enacted such 
a “change” in public opinion. The Eurobarometer 59 contextualised the report by refer-
encing the Iraq War — a war that continued until 2011 and presumably affected the public 
trust in institutions such as the armies and the national governments of the countries in-
volved in the war. The Eurobarometer 59 even mentions a “split between ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
Europe” (EB59, preface). The Eurobarometer 69 (2008, “1. Values of Europeans”, 2), 
on the other hand, contextualises the report by mentioning the 2008 financial crash and 
the “economic unease” that “is having an effect on the values of Europeans”. If we are to 
accept these contextualisations as true, then surely we are talking about two, separate and 
different, public opinions rather than one, same but changed, public opinion. The first is 
not enacted by the 2008 financial crisis, the second one is; the first one is enacted only by 
the first offensives against the regime of Saddam Hussein, the second by five years of 





same attitudes, but rather two different objects translated as one attitude in relation to one 
issue: “trust in key democratic institutions”. 
Mudde (2010) could have referenced the EB59 or the EB69 when he referenced the EB66 
— but he did not. He could have reported the “46 percent” rather than the “58 percent” 
— but he did not. These choices, for whatever reason they were made, remain manifested 
in Mudde’s enactment of populism. Given that Mudde could have chosen other data, other 
propositions and other statements — that is other enactors altogether — populism a la 
Mudde (2010) could have been enacted as a different object than it is in its current man-
ifestation. That object would not have been more “right” or “wrong” than the one enacted 
in Mudde’s article, but it would have been different. But he did not enact that object, he 
enacted this one — making the other potential populisms invisible in the Hinterland (Law 
2004) of Eurobarometer surveys, waiting for some other enactors to re-enact them. 
Statement three: a substantial majority of Europeans think that 
there is corruption in either national or EU institutions 
Regarding the issue of corruption, a prominent staple of populist radical right 
propaganda, the Special Eurobarometer 291 (‘The Attitudes of Europeans to-
wards Corruption’), of April 2008, reported that 75 per cent of EU-27 citizens 
totally agree or tend to agree that corruption is a major problem in their country. 
[– –] According to the Special Eurobarometer 245 (‘Opinions on Organized, 
Cross-National Border Crime and Corruption’), 59 per cent of the EU-25 believe 
that giving or receiving bribes is not successfully prosecuted. Of the categories of 
people that are believed to be corrupt, ‘politicians at national level’ top the list, 
with 60 per cent of the EU-25 respondents thinking they are corrupt [– –]. Politi-
cians at the regional level (47 per cent) and at the local level (45 per cent) are 
ranked fourth and fifth. Although the Special Eurobarometer 291 reports lower 
figures, they are still significant minorities of 46 per cent (national politicians) 
and 37 per cent (regional and local politicians). 
Finally, a specific target of populist radical right propaganda is the European Un-
ion, which is described as a thoroughly corrupt bureaucratic Moloch. Surveys 
show that this view is shared by a substantial majority of Europeans. The Special 





believe that corruption exists within EU institutions; which is actually down from 
71 per cent in 2005. (Mudde 2010, 1177–1178) 
Once again, we have a handful of propositions to take into account: “75 per cent of EU-
27 citizens totally agree or tend to agree that corruption is a major problem in their coun-
try”; “59 per cent of the EU-25 believe that giving or receiving bribes is not successfully 
prosecuted”; “of the categories of people that are believed to be corrupt, politicians at 
national level top the list, with 60 per cent of the EU-25 respondents thinking they are 
corrupt”; “politicians at the regional level (47 per cent)” are ranked fourth; “politicians at 
local level (45 per cent)” are ranked fifth; and, finally, “66 per cent of citizens of the EU-
27 believe that corruption exists within EU institutions” (Mudde 2010, 1177–1178). Six 
propositions to enact one statement about one issue: corruption. 
Both the Special Eurobarometer 245 and 291 presumably represent the same objects: the 
same questions are asked about the same issues. However, as discussed above, the sam-
ples (EU25 and EU27), the times (2005 and 2007), and the contexts are different. I am 
not going into detail about these here, since the multiplicity associated with size, time and 
location have been discussed already. However, there are two (or three) points to be made 
about the enactment of “corruption” here. 
First, I want to get out of the way another error made by Mudde. The Special Euroba-
rometer 245 (2005, 16) reports that 54 percent of the respondents believe that politicians 
at the national level are corrupt, contrary to the 60 percent reported by Mudde. Another 
honest mistake, perhaps. Second, both Mudde and the Special Eurobarometer 291 Other 
the distinction between “totally agree” and “tend to agree” by reporting these proportions 
as a singular object: as the 75 percent who either totally agree or tend to agree that cor-
ruption is a major problem in their country; instead of reporting that 39 percent totally 
agree, and 36 percent tend to agree (SEB291, 3). Never mind that we cannot know how 
the respondents themselves interpret these two options (thus making such statistical mul-
tiple-choice questions controversial and problematic in general), the pressing thing to rec-
ognize here is that these are two separate objects enacted separately in the survey. Agree-





Thirdly, let us consider the final paragraph of the citation above. Mudde (2010) associates 
the populist radical right propaganda with the Special Eurobarometer 291 results regard-
ing the belief whether corruption exists within the EU institutions. The belief that the EU 
institutions are corrupt is argued to explain why the PRR propaganda targets the EU spe-
cifically. But who enacts the link between the propaganda and this belief? What does this 
propaganda really say? Mudde does not clarify this, thus black-boxing the association 
between corruption and PRR propaganda. The practices that enact the propaganda are 
completely Othered. The connection ends up being irrelevant, since it is Mudde who en-





6 Conclusions and discussion 
This thesis set out to describe the multiplicity of practices and enactors behind the concept 
of populism, as it is practiced in Mudde’s (2010) study, in order to argue for an ontolog-
ical turn away from the representationalist paradigm, which seems to have driven the 
conceptualisation of populism to a dead-end. By presenting an alternative ontology (non-
modern multiple ontology) and a methodological approach (allegorical praxiography) to 
studying the mess and multiplicity that begin to appear once we abandon the tenets of 
modern representationalism, I have presented an example of such multiplicity of popu-
lism by studying the many practices and entities that enact Mudde’s (2010) study. 
6.1 Findings 
In line with the ideational approach, Mudde (2004; 2007; 2010) has conceptualised pop-
ulism as a thin-centred ideology with a certain content: anti-elite and anti-establishment 
attitudes. These types of attitudes manifest the ideological feature of populism. In order 
to argue for a paradigm shift towards a “pathological normalcy thesis”, Mudde (2010) 
demonstrates that such PRR attitudes are indeed “normal” in Europe — in other words, 
present in the majority of Europeans — by analysing the attitudes enacted in recent Eu-
robarometer surveys. However, as this thesis has argued, none of the objects (attitudes as 
enacted in the Eurobarometer) referenced by Mudde (2010) regard “populism” per se, 
but are translated as equivalent with anti-elite and anti-establishment attitudes by the 
methodological practices of Mudde. Mudde (2010) produces such an equivalency in three 
central statements and twelve propositions. 
A precondition to studying populism as an attitudinal or ideational construct is the pre-
sumption that there are a priori attitudes out there equivalent to the ideological feature 
of populism. This is also a precondition to representationalism in general (Barad 2003, 
Law 2004), and to the methodological premises of the Eurobarometer surveys in particu-
lar (Aldrin 2011, Signorelli 2012), which claim to measure European public opinions and 
attitudes about issues related to the European Union. However, as this thesis has argued, 





actors, issues and locations — the Eurobarometer never measures nor represents a priori 
attitudes about a priori issues. Rather, in order for such attitudes to be “represented”, a 
questionnaire as an inscription device needs to be set up in order to enact the issues and 
attitudes in here — in the survey itself. The attitudes, the issues and the locations are 
performed to represent a reality out there.  
The attitudes only become enacted as such in the context of the surveys. The respondents 
do not hold a priori attitudes about the exact issues as they are enacted in the survey (or 
this is at least highly improbable). Rephrased slightly, it does not matter whether or not 
the respondents hold a priori attitudes. What matters is the enacting practices of the ques-
tionnaire. It is enough that the respondent acts (responds) according to the framework and 
the logic set in advance by the survey. The survey does not, in any instance, represent the 
“out there” — it produces attitudes out there, by defining in advance the issues, the con-
text and the framework onto which the attitudes may be situated. It performs the out there 
which it claims to represent. The attitudes are never derived from a European public ex-
isting independently regardless of the producing power of the surveys. The European 
public, as the holder of European attitudes, is as well performed in the surveys with ref-
erence to multiple levels of location, multiple issues and certain European attitudes. If we 
take the multiplicity of enactors, issues and locations seriously, the attitudes that enact 
“populism” in Mudde’s study no longer appear to be singular, but multiple — more than 
one, less than many (Mol 2002). 
What happens as these attitudes travel to Mudde’s (2010) study and are translated as pop-
ulist attitudes is a sort of a double enactment. Not only are these attitudes enacted as 
representations of the European public opinion in the Eurobarometer, Mudde (2010) en-
acts them in fact again as new objects: anti-elite and anti-establishment attitudes. How-
ever, not all attitudes enacted in the Eurobarometer are granted the privilege to be re-
enacted as populism, only a few chosen ones — those that fit the conditions of equiva-
lence set by the concept of populism, and which are thus welcomed into the collective 
(Latour 2004). Indeed, from the perspective of performativity and multiplicity, the con-
cept seems to act. It works, together with Cas Mudde, as a hybrid gatekeeper, only letting 





Now we can discover what practices enact populism and what populism itself enacts — 
here, in the case of a study by Mudde (2010) — by recognising the performativity of the 
concept. We have recognized actors and practices (respondents who respond, interview-
ers who interview, questionnaires that inscribe, reports that translate), issues (satisfaction 
with democracy, trust in institutions, and belief in corruption) and locations (nations, ter-
ritories, organisations and imagined communities) — each of these entities participate in 
the enactment of populism as an attitudinal construct and an ideological feature as defined 
by Cas Mudde in his article “Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy” (2010).  
But this movement is not one-way traffic. It is not sufficient to state that the entities en-
acted in the Eurobarometer have simply travelled to another study in order to enact an-
other entity in it. In addition, there is a movement from Cas Mudde to the Eurobarometer. 
By using the concept of populism as an inscription device to translate the disparate atti-
tudes presented in the Eurobarometer as equivalences to populism, Mudde — both as a 
product and a producent of nonhuman enactors — re-enacts the Eurobarometer as data 
regarding populist attitudes. By studying populism and the Eurobarometer deductively, 
Mudde in fact enacts the concept populism as a methodological device to tell something 
about the Eurobarometer — and vice versa. Without this reverse movement, the attitudes 
could never travel well enough to be translated as anti-elite and anti-establishment atti-
tudes. They cannot travel by themselves: they need a push, some guidance. Without an a 
priori concept of populism and this double movement, Mudde would not know what he 
should be looking for in the Eurobarometer data, and the attitudes would not travel. With-
out organising concepts, the world appears as a mess. 
This leaves us with the question of what the concept of populism is in all this mess. If it 
is not a theoretical model granted with representativity of the “real” phenomenon out 
there, what does it do for us? What does it tell us about the real world? After all, the 
nonmodern ontology is not against realism per se, only against an essentialist conception 
of the real (Latour 1999a). A way to strive towards a nonmodern conception of the reality 
of populism is not to focus on what the object of populism is — since it is an ever-chang-
ing mess of multiplicities always enacted differently in different settings by different ac-





is enacted and, consequently, what sort of populist realities it enacts. By observing how 
it is produced in multiple sites by multiple actors, we might find out how it is enacted to 
being something. 
This move away from essentialism and representationalism entails an understanding of 
the concept not as an object or a representation of an object, but as a Thing — an actor 
being made to act; a subject enacting others. It does not represent; it assembles a collec-
tive of actors to discuss, debate and articulate sets of issues. It is not a matter of fact in 
the sense that one could conclude that “populism is this and its content is that”, but it is a 
matter of concern to a huge collective of political scientists, politicians, voters, journalists 
— but also nations, surveys, percentages and Master’s theses. Populism is some-thing 
that “creates a public around it” (Latour 2005b, 6) and then it acts. Instead of black-box-
ing it as an object-in-itself, now is the time to study how it acts and how it is made to act. 
6.2 Reflections 
This has been a case study, a praxiography in the practices of Cas Mudde (2010) and the 
many associated actors. However, even though this is a case study, the results of this 
study are ontologically generalisable, since they have been produced by similar methods 
as practiced by Mol (2002) and Law (2009) among others. If I managed to display some 
of the many practices and actors enacting this conception of populism in this specific 
case, then I see no reasons as to why a similar study could not be done about other con-
ceptualisations or other political concepts for that matter. However, due to the situated-
ness of this study, I do not claim that similar case studies will produce similar results. The 
practices, as enacted by specific concepts, matters, and researchers, vary from case to 
case. Nevertheless, I believe there to be one significant constant, which is also empha-
sized in this thesis: the multiplicity of reality. 
A methodological problem with these kind of science studies, approaching the research 
object from a standpoint of multiplicity and mess, is that the entities in question lack a 
priori boundaries, because once one accepts that nothing has an essence, the problem one 





boundaryless case. A network of practices, that is an “actor-network” in the vocabulary 
of Actor-Network Theory (ANT), has no “outside” (Latour 1996). This is one of the main 
methodological criticisms towards ANT. How, where and when do you stop? At some 
point the analyst always reaches an uncertainty, since these networks are by definition 
infinite. But as John Law (2004, 2) writes about studying a mess:  
If much of the world is vague, diffuse or unspecific slippery, emotional, ephem-
eral, elusive or indistinct, changes like a kaleidoscope, or doesn’t really have 
much of a pattern at all, then where does this leave social science? How might we 
catch some of the realities we are currently missing? Can we know them well? 
Should we know them? Is ‘knowing’ the metaphor that we need? 
Is “knowing” the metaphor that we need? The answer, from a multiple ontology that deals 
with a mess, is maybe. Knowing certainly? No. There is no way of reaching certainty 
about a mess. Knowledge, from this standpoint, is uncertain. Instead of striving towards 
a positivist version of realism, the better option would surely be to remain uncertain as 
long as possible (Harman 2014, Law 2004). And uncertain is definitely what I have been 
as I have been working on this thesis. 
Another issue central to this ontology is the demand for constant self-reflection. There is 
no escaping the fact that I am myself enacted in this study. If the premise of my ontology is 
that each actor is enacted by some other actors, then I need to accept that I am myself enacting 
the very actors described in this thesis. In other words, I have not revealed or presented the 
multiplicity of actors performing the objects central to Mudde’s (2010) study and the Euro-
barometer — I have produced these entities as they are described in this thesis, just as the 
Eurobarometer produces public opinions and Mudde (2010) produces PRR attitudes. On 
the other hand, would I be writing a thesis about the concept of populism as a multiple 
concept if I had not become interested in this Thing and thus been enacted as a sociologist 
doing a science study of populism? No. I am in the very middle of a network of practices 
enacting “populism”. Exactly where I stand in this mess, I do not know for sure. 
I also want to reiterate that my intention has not been to do a “sociological critique” in 
the Bourdieusian fashion, as presented by Aldrin (2010) and Signorelli (2012), nor a study 





certain conceptualisation of populism in a political study. The methods of Mudde (2010) 
and the Eurobarometer are of course criticisable, but for such a critique to make sense 
within the epistemologies in which they are situated (Haraway 1988), my view is that one 
should direct the critique from a similar standpoint (Harding 2014). Mudde’s (2010) 
methods might make sense from the standpoint of a “representationalist” ideational ap-
proach; as might the methods used in the making of the Eurobarometer make sense, if 
one accepts the premises of public opinion surveys as ontologically valid. On the other 
hand, someone doing such a methodological critique might find that these methods are 
not “methodologically proper” — Mudde (2010) indeed seems to have made questionable 
methodological choices. However, these kinds of social “errors” have not been my focus 
in this study. For this reason, I do not see this as a methodological critique of Cas Mudde 
specifically, because I do not criticise his methods per se, but this is definitely a critique 
of the ontological presumptions validating such methods in general. From my standpoint 
(Harding 2014), where I am situated (Haraway 1988), these sort of representationalist 
methods are in general problematic. 
I also do not wish to undermine Mudde’s expertise as a political scientist and his reputa-
tion as an expert in populism. As mentioned, Mudde is one of the most established and 
recognized experts on the populist radical right. This said, his position as an expert with 
a certain authority to make claims about the nature of populism does not mean that this 
position of authority should not be challenged, and his statements questioned. This would, 
however, require a detailed study in Mudde’s methodology from a more explicit critical 
standpoint than in this study. 
This thesis lacks such a perspective on expertise, power and authority. There are many 
science studies scholars who have discussed the role of expertise in the production of 
knowledge (e.g. Collins and Evans 2002; Epstein 1995; Wynne 1996) — a field of study 
that could have been taken into account in this thesis, given Mudde’s expert position in 
the field of populism studies. For now, however, it is enough to state that given that 
Mudde exercises a certain expertise and authority over his research objects and the read-
ers of his study, he might have had more freedom to Other relevant practices, which might 





attitudes. In addition, readers who are unfamiliar with the issue of populism and new to 
the field of populism studies might not have the tools to question these black-boxed state-
ments made by experts such as Mudde. However, this sort of Othering is difficult to place 
under scrutiny; after all, everything cannot be included in 15-25-page academic journal 
articles, which (somewhat ironically to the topic of Mudde’s article) leaves the reader 
with the issue of trust in Mudde’s expertise and the institution of social sciences. As for 
myself, I too have Othered an awful lot to make my findings fit into these 70 pages. I too 
leave the reader with the issue of trust. 
Since Cas Mudde is one of the most cited scholars in the field of populism studies, and 
because “populism” is such a contested concept, a lot of scholars are already critical of 
Mudde’s concept and methodology. Benjamin Moffitt (2016) is arguably the most known 
critic of Mudde. Carlos de la Torre and Oscar Mazzoleni (2019), on the other hand, sum-
marise both methodological advantages and disadvantages of Mudde’s concept, albeit 
from a rather representationalist perspective. From the ontologically performative front, 
an example of a feminist critique of Mudde — and the field of populism studies in general 
— is an article by Bice Maiguashca (2019), who criticises the conception of a populism 
“out there”. However, I am not aware of any critiques of Mudde nor of the field of popu-
lism studies from the standpoint of ontological multiplicity. 
Another focus which could have been included in more detail in this thesis is a focus on 
materiality. Most theorists referenced in relation to the nonmodern multiple ontology 
have emphasised the role of nonhuman matter in the production of social theories, arguing 
for a posthumanist approach to social sciences (e.g. Barad 2003; Haraway 1988; 1991; 
Latour 1993; 1999a; 2004; Law 2004; Mol 2002). Such a focus on materiality is not spe-
cifically emphasised in this thesis, even though I have discussed the role of inscription 
devices as enactors (for example questionnaires and reports). The nonhuman agency dis-
cussed in this thesis has regarded “ideas” rather than “matter”: the agency of concepts, 
issues, locations, nations, organisations, etc. In other words, Things that are difficult to 
treat as matter — even though these are all also matters of matter (Barad 2003). A closer 
focus on the matter enacting a study of populism would, I believe, have required an eth-





Finally, I wish to state that this is definitely an unfinished project. While the social sci-
ences have in general started to adopt a “nonmodern ontology” — the success of ANT 
and the ontological turns in STS being indicative of such a move away from modernist 
epistemologies (Law 1999; Jensen 2017) — political science still relies heavily on repre-
sentationalist models of politics. This Master’s thesis is my contribution to an ontological 
turn in political science in general and in populist studies in particular. However, it is 
certainly not possible to argue convincingly enough for an ontological turn in one of the 
largest fields of study in contemporary political science in a single (although multiple) 
Master’s thesis. Such a turn requires that more political scientists and science studies 
scholars come together to form a trans-disciplinary movement towards an alternative on-
tology. As Bueger and Bethke (2014) have noticed, quite little attention has been spent 
on how political concepts are produced and sustained in practice. A reason to why STS-
scholars might not have given political concepts quite enough attention is that the concept 
of politics itself is a contested concept in STS (Brown 2015, 4). Graham Harman (2014, 
1) has noted that even though Latour has been “thoroughly political from the very begin-
ning of his career” — that is, emphasised the political aspects of science-making —, he 
has not been able to develop a very coherent and well-articulated political philosophy. 
However, a potential model theorised by Bruno Latour (e.g. 2003; 2005b; 2007), which 
could be reworked to meet the demands of the concept of populism, could be the “political 
circle”. In this notion of “the political”, politics is not understood as a domain, in which 
a priori political actors do a priori political things. Rather, the Things assemble not only 
political actors, but any relevant actors, to talk politically about any sort of issues. Nothing 
is political in advance, rather anything can be talked about politically. Instead of being a 
specific domain in the society, politics becomes rather a way of solving conflicts, discuss-
ing issues and assembling collectives — a particular manner of speech (Latour 2003; 
2013). It becomes a circular process sparked by a Thing, hence Latour’s fondness of the 
term Dingpolitik over the term Realpolitik — a politics interested in Things and issues 
rather than representations of “the real” (Latour 2005b). Instead of being a model of pol-
itics per se, it is a model that accounts for how politics is performed in certain settings. 
This sort of a modification of the “the political” could work as a reference point for schol-





especially helpful in evaluating studies depending on public opinion surveys, as the po-
litical circle takes into account how such publics are performed for an issue to be dealt 
with politically. No issue, no public, no politics. 
Here is a Copernican revolution of radical proportions: to finally make politics 
turn around topics that generate a public around them instead of trying to define 
politics in the absence of any issue, as a question of procedure, authority, 
sovereignty, right and representativity. (Latour 2007, 814 – 815) 
In such an understanding of politics, “populism” ceases being an object that represents a 
thing out there; it becomes the Thing itself. There is no longer a way of distinguishing the 
concept from the phenomenon out there, since the phenomenon out there ceases to exist 
without the concept. It is the concept that assembles everything we “know” about it. With-
out the concept of populism, there is nothing that could assemble all the necessary actors, 
practices, effects, consequences, issues and locations into a singular phenomenon. As 
stated at the beginning of this thesis: there is nothing wrong with the concept! The concept 
cannot be right or wrong, accurate or diverse, good or bad, when there is no longer any-
thing to be right or wrong about — something to represent accurately or well. The concept 
is not too ambiguous, on the contrary, the real issue is that it is not understood ambigu-
ously enough. It is a mess! It is supposed to be! By treating it as a particularity, we rob it 
of its productivity. The concept does not describe, capture or represent populism. It does 
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